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THE REINCARNATION OF RULE 152: FALSE HOPE ON
THE INTEGRATION FRONT
LymA,

JOHNSON*

& STEVE PATTERSON**

In a series of recent no-action letters,' the staff of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) has breathed life into rule 152,2 an obscure,
near-dormant regulation enacted in the mid-1930s. 3 The SEC has used the
procession of rule 152 no-action requests as an opportune occasion for
partially revisiting a concept that long has plagued securities professionalsthe doctrine of integration. Essentially, the SEC now interprets rule 152 as
precluding integration of a section 4(2) private placement of securities with
a subsequent registered public offering of additional securities even if the
issuer contemplated the public offering at the time the private placement
commenced and undertook the public offering shortly after completing the
private placement. 4 Naturally, because this position appears to bring a
measure of certainty to at least one part of the integration conundrum,
issuers and their legal counsel will greet the development with great enthusiasm.
This article, after first describing the irksome manner in which the
integration doctrine constrains capital financing decisions, examines rule 152
in depth and concludes that the SEC has chosen the wrong vehicle for
seeking to settle a portion of the integration controversy. Historically, the

* Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. B.A. 1973, Carleton
College; J.D. 1978, University of Minnesota.
** Editor in Chief, Washington and Lee Law Review. B.S.B.A. 1987, University of
Arkansas; Candidate for J.D. 1990, Washington and Lee University.
1. See Country First Bank, SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 31, 1989) (LEXIS, Fedsec
library, Noact file) (stating that, under rule 152, public offering following offering otherwise
exempt under rule 506 of regulation D does not vitiate rule 506 exemption); Vintage Group,
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,700, at
77,978 (Apr. 11, 1988) (stating that rule 152 precludes integration of exempt private offering
with registered public offering as long as public offering follows private offering); The Immune
Response Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Nov. 2, 1987) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file)
(relying on rule 152 to preclude integration of exempt private offering and registered public
offering that followed private offering); Vulture Petroleum Corp., SEC No-Action Letter,
[1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,407, at 77,319 (Dec. 31, 1986) (same);
BBI Assocs., SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 29, 1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (stating
that filing of registration statement subsequent to offering otherwise exempt from registration
under § 4(2) does not vitiate exemption provided by § 4(2)); Verticom, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter (Feb. 12, 1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (same); infra notes 61-90 and
accompanying text (discussing SEC's current interpretation of rule 152).
2. 17 C.F.R. 230.152 (1985).
3. See Securities Act Release No. 33-305 (Mar. 2, 1935) (available from SEC; reprinted
in Appendix) (adopting rule 152).
4. See infra notes 61-90 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's current interpretation
of rule 152).
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SEC designed rule 152 for a very limited purpose-to enable a failed private
offering to be salvaged by a registered public re-offering of the unsold
securities-a purpose well-suited for the financial stagnation of the mid1930s, but one that is unrelated to the modem phenomenon of successful
multiround private financings culminating in a registered public offering of
still more securities. Therefore, while in fact the rule is linguistically amenable to the SEC's recent reading, a point that commentators heretofore
have not recognized, the rule is made so only by distorting its intended
purpose and committing historical error. Consequently, the article concludes
that the securities bar should not be overly comforted by, and indeed should
proceed cautiously with respect to, the SEC's new interpretive tack, particularly in light of continuing liability to disgruntled investors. Moreover,
however laudable and meritorious SEC efforts on the nagging integration
front might be, rule 152 is not a suitable instrument, and the no-action
letter is not the proper format, for a dramatic shift in policy. Thus, we
further conclude that the SEC should approach the whole notion of integration in a more forthright and punctilious fashion. Throughout this article
we hope to make clear that the entire integration controversy ultimately
implicates the larger question of the policies and purposes of registration
and of exemptions therefrom, and that the SEC in its regulatory efforts on
the integration front must be ever mindful of that relationship.
I.

INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM: THE REALITY OF MULTIROUND
FINANCING AND THE

DOCTRINE

OF INTEGRATION.

Lacking adequate cash flow from operations, many start-up and emerging businesses turn to the financial markets for capital. Because the amount
and timing of capital needs are difficult to predict, and because investors
are reluctant to "overfund" unproven ventures, young companies often will
return to the capital markets again and again for periodic infusions of cash.
The result is that many companies engage in multiple "rounds" of financing
before generating sufficient internal cash to slake their thirst for outside
capital.
The process of capital formation does not occur in a regulatory vacuum.
Both federal and state laws regulate the issuance of securities for value.
Section 55 of the Securities Act of 19336 (the Securities Act) prohibits the
public offering of securities until the issuer files a registration statement
with the SEC and prohibits the sale of securities until the registration
statement becomes effective. 7 Although the registration process affords the
5. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982).
6. Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982). Congress based the Securities Act on the premise that
Congress can best protect investors that are unable to fend for themselves by requiring full
and fair disclosure. See Preamble to the Act, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (stating purposes of Securities
Act). Those investors then can make intelligent investment decisions. Id. To achieve full and
fair disclosure, § 5 of the Securities Act requires that issuers must register all nonexempt
offerings of securities. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982).
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SEC an opportunity to review and comment on the registration statement
to determine whether an issuer has made various required disclosures to the
public about the issuer, the issuer's business, and the securities themselves,
the registration process is costly and time-consuming and, from the issuer's
standpoint, is to be avoided if at all possible.
In spite of its broad reach, the coverage of the Securities Act, unlike
that of its counterpart the Securities Exchange Act of 19348 (the Exchange
Act), is episodic. An issuer triggers the intricate regimen of the Securities
Act only when it "offers" or "sells" a "security." 9 Even then, an issuer
can avoid the requirements and proscriptions of section 5 of the Securities
Act-and the resulting liability for certain Securities Act miscues10-if the
security to be issued or the financing transaction to be engaged in can be
brought within one of several exemptions from registration.,'
Importantly, an exemption from registration applies only to offers and
sales associated with a particular transaction, not to capital-raising transactions that precede or follow the exempt transaction. For a company that
seeks capital on more than one occasion in a relatively short period of time,
the question arises as to whether each episode is part of one or more
"transactions" that have preceded or followed the episode, or whether the
episode truly stands alone as a discrete capital-raising incident. Because the
Securities Act contains several transactional exemptions-each with distinct
conditions, policy underpinnings, and rubric, and all of which the SEC and
courts will strictly construe against the issuer 2-two or more seemingly

8. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
78a-78kk (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
9. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982) (requiring issuer to register securities that issuer offers
or sells unless securities are otherwise exempt). While defined in sections 2(3) and 2(1) of the
Securities Act, respectively, the terms "sell" and "offer" and the term "security" have, over
the years, been interpreted broadly. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, JR., SEculuI~s REGULATION
69-109, 220-93 (6th ed. 1987) (discussing courts' interpretations of terms "sell," "offer," and
"security").

10. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 (1982) (defining liability for certain violations of Securities
Act). Section 11 of the Securities Act applies only to securities transactions for which a
registration statement has become effective. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982). However, the liability
provisions of § 17 and, except for government securities, that of § 12(2) of the Securities Act,
apply as well to exempted securities and transactions. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 771, 77q (1982).
11. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, JR., supra note 9, at 298-452 (discussing exemptions
of Securities Act). The Securities Act contains many exemptions from the Act's registration
requirements. See id. Those exemptions grounded in §§ 3(a)(11), 3(b), and 4(2) have been of
especial importance. See id. at 298-395 (discussing §§ 3(a)(11), 3(b), and 4(2)).
12. See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953) (holding that issuer
relying on exemption has burden of proving exemption's availability); SEC v. Culpepper, 270
F.2d 241, 246 (2d Cir. 1959) (stating that issuer relying on exemption has burden of proving
exemption's availability); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir. 1959)
(same); SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mining Co., 95 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1938) (stating that
terms of exemption must be strictly construed against one seeking to rely on exemption);
Securities Act Release No. 33-4552, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2783, at 2922 (Nov. 6, 1962)
(stating that terms of exemption are to be strictly construed against claimant who also has
burden of proving exemption's availability).
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separate exempt transactions that in fact are parts of a single large financing
effort may not, when so viewed, meet the exacting requirements of the
hoped-for exemptions. As a result, none of the transactions may qualify
for the putative exemption, and all may violate section 5 of the Securities
Act, thereby exposing the issuer, and conceivably others, to liability under
section 12(l). 13 In short, earlier (or later) approaches to the capital markets
might jeopardize the legal status of later (or earlier) approaches.
To regard an apparently discrete capital financing transaction as, in
fact, a part of another transaction is, in a word, to "integrate" the two
transactions. Although not expressly a part of federal securities statutes,
and even though securities lawyers view the concept as an unsettling nuisance, the doctrine of integration has played a vital role in the framework
of federal regulation of securities almost since the Securities Act's inception. 14 Without the doctrine, opportunistic issuers could split an undeniably
nonexempt transaction, i.e., a public offering, into two or more components
and seek to qualify each of the components under one or more exemptions.
The effect would be to subvert the Securities Act by avoiding the very
predicate of registration-the existence of a "public offering." Thus, while
today the concept of integration is much maligned and remains a continuing
source of frustration because of its admittedly crude and hazy configuration,
the notion of integration is a doctrinal construct born of regulatory necessity.
This remains true even as heightened attention has been given in recent
years to yet another policy objective of the Securities Act-fostering capital
formation." In this altered regulatory environment the doctrine of integra-

13. See 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1982) (holding liable any person who offers or sells securities
in violation of § 77e of Securities Act). Clearly, the issuer faces liability as a "seller" under
§ 12 of the Securities Act. See Pinter v. Dahl, 108 S.Ct. 2063, 2075-83 (1988) (considering
whether court may hold defendant liable under § 12(1) as statutory seller). In Pinterthe United
States Supreme Court articulated guidelines for determining who else may face liability under
§ 12(1). Id. at 2076-77. Courts have applied, and undoubtedly will continue to apply, the
Pinterguidelines in § 12(2) cases. See, e.g., Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 111315 (5th Cir. 1988) (applying Pinterguidelines).
14. See In re Unity Gold Corp., 3 S.E.C. 618, 623-26 (1938) (analyzing whether offerings
constituted separate "issues"); cf. Securities Act Release No. 33-97, 1 Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
1027, at 2056 (Dec. 28, 1933) (stating that intrastate offering exemption is available only if
entire issue is sold to residents within single state).
15. Congress is quite solicitous of the capital raising needs of small business. For example,
pursuant to the Small Business Investment Incentive Act, Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2275
(1980), Congress in 1980 increased the § 3(b) ceiling from $2,000,000 to the section's current
level of $5,000,000. Congress also adopted § 4(6), which exempts "transactions involving offers
or sales by an issuer solely to one or more accredited investors," provided that the following
requirements are met: (1) the aggregate offering price does not exceed $5,000,000, (2) the
issuer files a notice with the SEC in prescribed form, and (3) "there is no advertising or public
solicitation in connection with the transaction by the issuer or anyone acting on the issuer's
behalf." 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c, 77d(6). The same year Congress passed the Omnibus Small Business
Capital Formation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2291 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80c-80c-3 (1980)), which required the SEC to "use its best efforts to identify and reduce
the costs of raising capital in connection with the issuance of securities by firms whose
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tion still is needed, but the doctrine is subjected to an additional strain
because it must continue to serve the original goal of investor protection
while not unduly stifling capital formation, particularly for smaller businesses. Whether traditional formulations of the integration concept are (or
can be) sufficiently certain and "bright-line" so as not to dissuade legitimate
capital formation efforts, on the one hand, while remaining sufficiently
fluid to capture those efforts that should be subjected to registration on
investor protection grounds, on the other hand, is the root issue today.
Remaining mindful of the all-important but possibly evolving policy
underpinnings of the integration doctrine, from the standpoint of both an
issuer's lawyer and a policymaker the initial question of whether a specific
financing transaction is exempt from the registration requirements of the
Securities Act turns on the meaning of certain key words used in the
exemption provisions, words that the Securities Act itself does not define.
For example, section 3(a)(11) exempts from section 5 of the Securities Act
any security that is "part of an issue" offered and sold only to persons
residing within a single state.' 6 The traditional policy rationale for this
exemption is that states can provide the regulatory oversight needed to
protect their residents from capital raising activities occurring wholly within
their borders. So far as integration of two or more capital-seeking overtures
is concerned, the usual question that has arisen under section 3(a)(11) is
phrased as a definitional one, whether the SEC or a court might consider
an earlier or later overture to be "part of an issue"' 7 and, if so, whether
the earlier or later financing as combined with the other transaction still
complies with the stringent requirements of section 3(a)(11).18 In actuality,
of course, that ostensibly definitional question traditionally has been an-

aggregate outstanding securities and other indebtedness have a market value of $25,000,000 or
less" and to report annually on the SEC's efforts in this regard. Id. at § 506, 15 U.S.C. §
80c-3 (1980). The goal of fostering capital formation must be accommodated to the goal of
investor protection in the SEC's regulatory initiatives. See, e.g., Securities Act Release No.
33-6389 [1981-82 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,106, at 84,907 (stating that
regulation D was promulgated to facilitate capital formation consistent with protection of
investors).

16. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1982).
17. See Unity Gold Corp., 3 S.E.C. 618, 625 (1938) (stating that whether offering is
"part of an issue" depends upon whether offerings are related part of plan or programs);
Peoples Sec. Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-6176 (Feb. 10, 1960) (same); Securities
Act Release No. 33-4434, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
2271-72 (Dec. 6, 1961) (discussing
determination of whether offering is "part of an issue"); L. Loss, FUNDAMENTAIS OF SECURITIEs
REGuLATioN 297-98 & n.d (2d ed. 1988) (discussing consequences of issuer offering or selling
any part of § 3(a)(11) issue to nonresident). The same interpretive problem arises under §
3(a)(9), under § 3(b), and under rule 147, which was promulgated pursuant to § 3(a)(11).
18. See Opinion of the General Counsel, Securities Act Release No. 33-1459, 1 Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH)
2260-62, at 2605-07 (May 29, 1937) (discussing § 3(a)(11) requirements);
SEC v. Hillsborough Inv. Corp., 173 F. Supp. 86, 87-88 (D.N.H. 1958), permanent injunction,
176 F. Supp. 789, 790 (D.N.H. 1959), aff'd on other grounds sub nom., Hillsborough Inv.
Corp. v. SEC, 276 F.2d 665, 668 (1st Cir. 1960) (stating that any sale to nonresidents would
destroy § 3(a)(11) exemption as to all securities that are part of that issue).
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swered in a way that reflects a singular, unyielding policy objective of
investor protection as achieved by registration, an objective partially at odds
with the goal of facilitating capital formation.
The same integration question from a related policy standpoint arises
under a somewhat different linguistic formulation with respect to the section
4(2) exemption. Section 4(2) exempts transactions by an issuer "not involving
any public offering." 19 To this day the precise rationale(s) of this important
exemption remain murky, but many contend that certain kinds of persons
simply do not need the protections that registration affords. 20 While the
contour of section 4(2) needs a thorough revisiting in light of the Securities
Act's twin goals of investor protection and capital formation, the seemingly
narrower interpretive question is whether the integration doctrine will serve
to join two seemingly separate financings so that, taken together, the two
financings do indeed "involve" a "public offering" in that the combined
offerings no longer fall within the blurry but strict requirements of the
section 4(2) exemption. In fact, a proper resolution of this apparently
narrow integration question requires appreciation of the interrelationship of
the integration doctrine and the larger purposes of the Securities Act.
If the most basic objective of the Act is assumed to be registration
itself-rather than registration as one (possibly preferred) means for achieving more basic goals such as investor protection through the dissemination
of information and encouraging capital formation-in asking whether two
financings are "part of an issue" the inquiry is not really directed toward
determining whether the more basic goals themselves are being disserved by
failing to integrate. Instead, registration alone is the norm against which
issuer conduct is evaluated. With respect to section 4(2), even more so than
with section 3(a)(l1), however, the underlying purposes for the exemption
should be relevant to the question of whether two financings will be
integrated so as to lose the exemption. In that way exempted capital
formation activity is not viewed simply as a deviation from the norm of
registration, but as activity to be affirmatively valued and as achieving the
explicit policy objectives of the Securities Act. Doing so in the integration
context requires forthright consideration of what exactly investors would
have gained by the registration that should have occurred if two financings
are integrated-more and better information or "just" SEC review 2'-and

19. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982).
20. See Section 4(2) and Statutory Law-A Position Paper of the FederalRegulation of
Securities Committee, 31 Bus. LAW. 485, 489-95 (1975) (discussing conditions of § 4(2)
exemption); Fletcher, Sophisticated Investors Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1988 DuKE
L.J. 1081, 1120-24 (1988) (discussing § 4(2) cases in which courts emphasize that sophisticated
offerees do not need protection that registration provides).
21. The question of what investors would have gained by a registration of securities that
should have occurred if two financings are integrated is an even more basic question than
whether and how "sophistication" ought to matter for § 4(2) and other provisions of the
federal securities laws, a subject recently dealt with by Professor Fletcher. See Fletcher, supra
note 20, at 1120-24 (discussing importance of offerees' sophistication). As far as exemption
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what the investors lost in the exempted transactions. While courts may not
be well equipped to formulate the integration doctrine so as to affirmatively
value capital formation activity, the SEC certainly is.
The same problem exists with respect to transactions grounded in section
3(b) as provided for in rules 504 and 505 of regulation D and those "safe
harbor" section 4(2) transactions provided for in rule 506 of regulation D.
Section 3(b) states that no "issue" of securities sold under that subsection
may exceed $5,000,000,22 while rule 502(a) of regulation D states that all
sales that are "part of the same regulation D offering must meet all of the
terms and conditions of regulation D." ' 23 Thus, if a round of financing
under regulation D is integrated with an apparently separate round of
financing and so viewed as one financing, the separate rounds must, taken
together, meet the requirements of a particular rule under regulation D or,
unless the separate rounds happen to comply with the terms and conditions
of yet another exemption, the offering will violate section 5 of the Securities
Act.
Again, if registration as an end in itself is the benchmark against which
all capital formation activity is to be assessed, perhaps it is appropriate that
the slightest aberration should expose issuers to liability. But that is to put
little, indeed no, weight on the other side of the balance-the good to be
realized by prudent but energetic capital formation, especially by smaller
businesses, and the way in which material information can be disseminated
successfully to investors in exempt transactions. Essentially, one can engage
in a quest for capital, but entirely at one's own risk, and with little sympathy
for error. Error is error, however minor, even if the larger purpose of the
law is fulfilled; close counts only in horseshoes.
While placing the burden of nonregistration on issuers may be entirely
appropriate, it would be immensely beneficial for both the doctrine of
integration and the doctrine that has grown up around exempt transactions
to clarify precisely what are the advantages of registration. By rule 502(b)
under regulation D, and in accordance with sound practice under other

from registration is concerned, financial sophistication is an important, but not sufficient,
condition, particularly if access to material information is lacking. Yet, if access to material
information is provided, why does investor sophistication matter for an exemption from
registration if sophistication is not a qualification for purchasing in a registered offering?
Rather than continuing to accept the distinction between "sophisticated" and "unsophisticated"
investors as relevant for § 4(2) exemption purposes, but not for registration, the SEC might
usefully focus on the kind and quality of information provided as the chief basis for an
exemption. So far, the SEC has not done that and, therefore, the significance of registration
is not what most commentators in the post-Ralston Purina era believe it is-i.e., access to
registration information-since near-equivalent information is provided (and can be so mandated) in many exempted transactions, but rather is the interjection of SEC review and
comment. This is odd given that, in recent years, few repeat registrants have had their
registration statements reviewed by the SEC with any thoroughness. Loss, supra note 17, at
124.

22. 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1982).
23. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (1985).
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exemptions, prospective investors in these transactions receive registration
statement-like information. Investors also receive the constraints on issuer
behavior as are imposed by the application of significant liability provisions. 24 What investors in exempt transactions do not receive is SEC review.
While not insignificant, the value of that oversight should be weighed
against, first, the benefits of exempted capital activity and the mandated
disclosure of information and fraud safeguards that continue to accompany
that activity and, second, the awesome liability exposure flowing from the
later integration of two or more financings and the potential chilling effect
of that risk on capital formation. Such an appraisal should expressly inform
the shape of the exemption and integration doctrines and the possibly toneddown consequences for running afoul of those doctrines.
Putting the problem of integration to the side for a moment, the quest
with respect to all of the transactional exemptions historically has been to
draw on experience to decipher the authoritative hallmarks of an "issue"
or an "offering"-a kind of exercise in legal taxonomy in which one
concludes that the presence of certain "markers" evidences the existence of
some more elemental legal condition just as the presence of tusks, a trunk,
and certain physical dimensions evidence the existence of an elephant. Not
knowing an "issue" or "offering" by sight, those lawyers working in the
securities area carefully review the list of supposedly objective features
commonly or invariably associated with an exemption's existence. Thus,
under section 3(a)(l1) much attention is given to notions of "residency"
and "doing business." Additionally, under section 4(2) the financial sophistication of offerees and the manner of offering have come to be
important to complying with the exemption. Various SEC rules have sought
to lend a measure of certainty to this task by creating certain "safe harbors."
Proceeding by inference is difficult enough when the question is simply
whether a single financing transaction qualifies for a particular exemption,
if only because the problem of assigning relative weights to the various
markers raises the usual array of classification questions. Is a putative
section 4(2) transaction really a private placement if the placement lacks a
particular characteristic? Is a beast without two tusks an elephant? Returning
to the problem of integration, the complexity quickly compounds when the
question is not simply whether a single financing passes muster under a
particular exemption, but also whether the financing is "part of" or
"involves" yet another financing. Here, too, the inclination has been to
concoct a supposedly definitive (and necessarily vague so as to cover all
cases) list of attributes that indicates whether or not one capital transaction
is "part of" or "involves" another capital transaction. Thus, at least since
the early 1960s, when the SEC promulgated its famous five-factor formula
for integration, much has been heard about whether two capital market
overtures are "part of a single plan of financing;" "involve issuance of the

24. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 (1982); supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing
liability sections of Securities Act).
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same class of securities;" involve sales "made at or about the same time;"
require the "same type of consideration;" or are made for the "same
general purpose. ' 25 Once two capital transactions are integrated pursuant
to this vague prescription, one then resorts to the first set of markers to
determine whether the larger transaction itself possesses the requisite number
of qualifying features of an exemption. If not, then it matters not at all
that investors received all material information and have the protection of
the liability provisions of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. The
absence of registration-thus the absence of SEC review-is fatal.
What may be lost in this talismanic approach is an appreciation of the
inescapable manner in which focusing on seemingly objective, definitional,
and linguistic matters is an attempt to identify properties that are believed
to correspond to, but are not the same as, the terms being defined. The
wooden reliance on traits always poses the risk of under- or over-inclusiveness. Furthermore, the properties themselves-e.g., a "single plan of financing" -require the very defining they were meant to supply for the more
elemental terms "issue" and "offering." Thus, several terms must be
defined or construed instead of one. Most important, however, a mechanical
and cataloging approach to this matter diverts attention from the fact that
the whole descriptive enterprise is policy driven. Furthermore, the enterprise
is driven erratically when the policies themselves-i.e., the baseline policies
to be achieved by registration and exemptions and, hence, integration-are,
26
as at present, somewhat uncertain or in a state of flux.

25. In 1961, the SEC addressed the integration issue in connection with § 3(a)(11) by
stating the following:
Any one or more of the following factors may be determinative of the question of
integration: (1) are the offerings part of a single plan of financing; (2) do the
offerings involve issuance of the same class of security; (3) are the offerings made
at or about the same time; (4) is the same type of consideration to be received, and
(5) are the offerings made for the same general purpose.
Securities Act Release No. 33-4434, 1 Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 2272, at 2608 (Dec. 6, 1961).
According to the preface, the presence of a single factor may lead to integration under
§ 3(a)(l1) and, because the same formulation is used in rule 147, under that rule as well.
In 1962 the SEC addressed the integration issue in connection with § 4(2). See Securities
Act Release No. 33-4552, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 2770-83, 2918-22 (Nov. 6, 1962). The
SEC again recited the five factors enumerated in 1961, but stated that the factors are merely
"relevant to [a] question of integration." Id. at 2781. As noted by Jennings and Marsh, the
SEC said nothing as to what weight should be given to the various factors, whether a single
factor might be determinative, or why the formulation differs from the formulation under §
3(a)(11) and rule 147. JENNNGs & MARsH, supra note 9, at 441.
26. The American Bar Association's Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities
stated that, originally, the goal of the Task Force on Integration was "to formulate an
analytical matrix, based upon objective criteria, for resolving all integration problems."
American Bar Association, Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Integration of
Securities Offerings: Report of the Task Force on Integration, 41 Bus. LAW. 595, 597 (1986)
[hereinafter ABA Task Force Report on Integration]. That effort was abandoned in favor of
devising a number of additional safe harbors because "the wide variety of offerings, securities
offered, exemptions relied upon, and other relevant factors make such a comprehensive,
analytical matrix virtually impossible to formulate." Id. at 624. We suspect a better reason
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For an issuer of securities that seeks funding in the capital markets
only once, or after relatively long intervals, the metaphysical mysteries of
integration and its relationship to larger policies of the Securities Act are
of no concern. Instead, these issuers are more interested in knowing with
some certainty that their singular offerings will meet the fairly strict conditions of the transactional exemptions. Recent SEC adoption of new rule
27
508 may improve the chances that these issuers will succeed in that quest.
However, for the many issuers who seek capital with some regularity,
integration may serve, with the clarity that only twenty/twenty hindsight
accords, to unravel a carefully planned series of capital market overtures.
The consequences can be dramatic, especially as one seemingly minor miscue
can undermine an issuer's contention that the offerings are distinct and that
the offerings' separate identities should remain intact. 28 Such issuer faces
SEC enforcement action, as well as the prospect of investor claims for
rescission, a course of action that could be financially devastating. In the
interim, the issuer that becomes aware of the likely prospect of integration
faces the decision of whether and how to reveal the contingent liability on
the issuer's financial statements, 29 financial statements that may be reviewed
by lenders, current shareholders, or even future investors and regulatory
authorities in a later public offering. As with other mischief, the consequences of the legal mischief created by the concept of integration quickly
can be magnified. Because of this issuers and their legal counsel long have
sought relief from the hazards associated with the integration doctrine. As
we will see, through its recent rule 152 responses the SEC has provided a
partial antidote, but the SEC fails to see that convincing resolution of the
integration puzzle depends, above all, on coming to a clearer understanding
of the place of (and requirements of) exemptions from registration in the
overall securities law regime.

for not tackling the whole of the integ:ation issue is that until certain bedrock policy issues
concerning the purpose of registration and exemptions therefrom are rethought in light of
modem conditions, such an effort is inappropriate and futile.
27. See Securities Act Release No. 33-6825, 54 Fed. Reg. 11,369, 11,374 (1989) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.508) (adopting new rule 508 as amendment to regulation D). New
rule 508 essentially provides a defense against civil liability for selling securities without
registration of the securities in reliance on substantial compliance with regulation D. See id.
(describing application of new rule 508). For a thorough treatment of new rule 508 and other
proposed changes to regulation D, see Schneider, A Substantial Compliance ("&I") Defense
and Other Changes Are Added to SEC Regulation D, - Bus. LAw. (forthcoming
1989). To qualify for the defense, the failure to comply with the regulation D requirements
must be insignificant and the party relying on the exemption must have acted in good faith
and with a reasonable attempt to comply. Securities Act Release No. 33-6825, 54 Fed. Reg.
11,369, 11,374 (1989) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.508).
28. The SEC believes that a single offer or sale to an unqualified offeree destroys the
exemption for the entire issue. Loss, supra note 17, at 297 n.d.
29. Professor Loss believes that the SEC would require the registration statement to
disclose a contingent liability under § 12(1) for selling in violation of § 5. Id. See In re Hayes
Mfg. Corp., 23 S.E.C. 574, 581-87 (1946) (discussing deficiencies in original registration
statements).
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THE PROBLEM: INTERPRETING RULE 152.

Rule 152 in its present form reads as follows:
DEFINITION OF "TRANSACTIONS
PUBLIC OFFERING"

BY AN ISSUER NOT INVOLVING ANY

IN SECTION 4(2) FOR CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS.

The phrase "transaction by an issuer not involving any public
offering" in Section 4(2) shall be deemed to apply to transactions
not involving any public offering at the time of said transaction
although subsequently thereto the issuer decides to make a public
30
offering and/or files a registration statement.
The SEC adopted rule 152 in 1935, just two years after Congress enacted
the Securities Act." Having been adopted so soon after passage of the
Securities Act, the SEC must have regarded the rule as important for
carrying out the purposes of that momentous legislation. Yet, the available
administrative history of rule 152 does not fully explain the situation(s) to
which the SEC originally intended the rule to apply. 2 The Securities Act
release announcing the SEC's adoption of rule 152 is the only official
33
statement of rule 152's purpose, and the release is distressingly brief.
Furthermore, the SEC apparently did not apply the rule to any specific
situation until 1986, when it issued a no-action letter expressing its surprising
4
interpretation of the rule.1
In addition to the sparse history concerning the purposes and scope of
rule 152, an inherent problem with the rule is its linguistic ambiguity,
particularly the problem of identifying the exact referent of the issuer's
post-section 4(2) offering behavior.35 In other words, the interpretive problem
is to determine precisely what action an issuer may take "subsequently
thereto" without vitiating the private placement exemption. The difficulty
occurs primarily because of the SEC's unsound use of conjunctive/disjunctive language in drafting the rule.3 6 That confusing drafting convention

30. 17 C.F.R. § 230.152 (1985).
31. See Securities Act Release No. 33-305 (Mar. 2, 1935) (available from SEC; reprinted
in Appendix) (adopting rule 152).
32. See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text (discussing sparsity of material concerning rule 152's purpose).
33. See Securities Act Release No. 33-305 (Mar. 2, 1935) (available from SEC; reprinted
in Appendix) (adopting rule 152).
34. See Verticom, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 12, 1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library,
Noact file) (interpreting rule 152 to preclude integration of successfully completed private
placement and subsequent registered public offering); infra notes 61-69 and accompanying text
(discussing Verticom no-action letter, which was SEC's first application of rule 152).
35. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.152 (1985) (containing rule 152); supra note 30 and accompanying
text (reprinting rule 152); infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (discussing ambiguity of
rule 152).
36. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (reprinting rule 152); infra notes 37-38 and
accompanying text (discussing ambiguity that rule 152's conjunctive/disjunctive language

creates).
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makes unclear whether the subjective decision to make a public offering or
only the objective filing of a registration statement must be made subsequent
to the section 4(2) placement to come within the rule. Thus, a close reading
of the rule reveals that the wording is ambiguous and that the rule can be
read in at least three very different ways.3 7 The following subparts seek to
sort through the ambiguities and explain in detail the rule's possible interpretations. 8 Later, we describe the interpretation adopted by the SEC and
offer an extended critique of its choice.
A.

Interpretation One.

In interpreting rule 152 the SEC could read the rule to say:
The phrase "transaction by an issuer not involving any public
offering" in Section 4(2) shall be deemed to apply to transactions
not involving any public offering at the time of said transaction
although subsequently thereto the issuer decides to make a public

offering [and/or files a registration statement]."
Under this interpretation rule 152 would preclude integration of a private
placement of securities followed closely by a public offering of yet additional
securities only if the issuer decided to make the public offering after the
issuer undertook, and presumably completed successfully, the private place-

37. See infra notes 39-60 and accompanying text (discussing three interpretations of rule
152).
38. See infra notes 39-60 and accompanying text (discussing ambiguity of rule 152's
language). Some of rule 152's ambiguity stems from reliance on a widely-used and beguiling
technique of drafting-the use of "and/or"-to describe coverage. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.152
(1985) (containing rule 152); supra note 30 and accompanying text (reproducing rule 152);
supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text (discussing ambiguity that rule 152's conjunctive/
disjunctive language creates). One commentator concisely has described the unexpected legal
trouble that the hybrid conjunction and disjunctive has caused in other settings. See B. CHmD,
DRAFro LEGAL DOCUMENTS 55-56 (1988) (discussing problems that lawyers' use of "and/or"
has caused). As Child notes, knowledgeable drafters uniformly have rallied against the hybrid
conjunction and disjunctive, and judges have construed the hybrid conjunction and disjunctive
against lawyers who have used it. See McCarty, That Hybrid "and/or", MICH. ST. B.J., May
1960, at 9 (discussing cases in which judges have construed "and/or" against lawyers who use
that phrase); see B. CHImD, DArrING LEGAL DocumErTS 55 (1988) (discussing fact that judges
have construed "and/or" against lawyers who use it). Yet another instructor of legal drafting
explains how use of the phrase "and/or" sometimes results in redundancy and other times in
outright contradiction. See D. MELLiNKOFF, LEGAL WRITNG: SENSE AND NONSENSE 55-56 (1982)
(discussing problems that "and/or" creates). In explaining how that drafting convention creates
contradiction or redundancy, Mellinkoff notes that lawyers who use "and/or" are lawyers in
a hurry and who are content to let others solve the problems that the lawyers create by
imprecise writing. Id. The commentator explains that lawyers can remove the ambiguity that
"and/or" creates simply by replacing "and/or" with "A or B or both" when such specification
is necessary. Id. at 56. The unfortunate ambiguity of rule 152 illustrates the inappropriateness
of the use of "and/or." See infra notes 39-60 and accompanying text (discussing ambiguity
that language of rule 152 creates).
39. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.152 (1985) (containing rule 152) (emphasis added); supra note

30 and accompanying text (reprinting rule 152).
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ment. 40 Under Interpretation One, assuming the unavailability of another
"safe harbor" precluding integration, the SEC could draw on its five-factor
formula to integrate any other public offering closely following a private
placement. Interpretation One focuses on the issuer's subjective intent and
thus requires an almost impossible fathoming of what combination of
subjective intent and objective manifestation of that intent constitutes "deciding." '4' As such, the rule affords virtually no reliable protection for an
issuer required to demonstrate the time at which the issuer's financing
decisions were made. Another problem with Interpretation One is that it
apparently, although maybe inadvertently, rewards an issuer who successfully completes a private offering but only then discovers either that the
issuer has not received adequate capital to finance the project for which
the issuer undertook the private offering or that the issuer now needs funds
for a different project. 42 On the other hand, the issuer who plans to complete
a private placement before launching a public offering may not rely on the
rule to preclude integration of the two financings because the issuer's
"decision" to make the public offering was made prior to the private
placement. Finally, whether the term "public offering" includes exempt
"public offerings"-such as widely-offered intrastate or rule 504 transactions-or only registered public offerings is not clear. While the use of both
the term "public offering" and the term "registration statement" in the
text of the rule supports inclusion of nonregistered public offerings within
the scope of the rule, the use of the conjunctive "and" indicates that the
public offering must also be registered. That, however, then raises the larger
question of what purpose the word "or" serves. "Or" seems to import a
more objective alternative-filing a registration statement, as opposed to
subjectively deciding to make a public offering, may also bring an issuer
within the rule. As such, the disjunctive language reveals the inherent
43
weakness of Interpretation One.

To illustrate the application of Interpretation One, suppose that Issuer
A wishes to obtain $1,000,000 through a section 4(2) private offering.
Having successfully completed the private offering, Issuer A discovers that
$1,000,000 will not fully cover the costs of the project. Issuer A then follows
the private offering with a registered public offering of an additional
$1,000,000 worth of securities. Under Interpretation One, rule 152 appar40. See infra note 44 (discussing ccmmentators who interpret rule 152 to preclude
integration of exempt private offering with subsequent public offering if issuer decided to

make public offering after issuer made private offering).
41. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (emphasizing in Interpretation One issuer's
decision to make public offering after issuer makes private offering).
42. See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text (explaining that Interpretation One
bestows bonanza on good faith issuer who underestimates capital that issuer wants from
private offering); infra note 44 (discussing commentators' interpretations of rule 152 that rule
apparently allows issuer who underestimates capital that issuer needs from private offering to
complete private offering by undertaking public offering).

43. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text (discussing ambiguity that "and/or"
creates).
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ently precludes integration of the two offerings, even though in retrospect
both offerings are for the same purpose. 44 However, the interpretation

provides no protection from integration for the issuer who, prior to commencing one or more private offerings, decides that the private placement(s)
will be followed by a registered public offering of additional securities-the
so-called "multiround financing." Moreover, this is so whether the purpose

of the subsequent public offering is to raise additional funding for the
project originally to have been financed wholly privately-a likely candidate

for integration-or is to raise capital for a wholly separate undertakingan unlikely candidate for integration. Thus, Interpretation One not only
bestows a bonanza on shortsighted issuers who miscalculate their capital
needs for a specific project, but the interpretation also does not offer
reliable protection against integration for farsighted issuers seeking to fund
one project via private financing and another project via public financing.
The latter issuers, equally deserving of certainty in planning their capital
financing activities, must seek uncertain solace in the traditional five-factor
test. 45 In short, Interpretation One leads to anomalous outcomes, uncertainty
of application, and little practical benefit.
B.

Interpretation Two.

Alternatively, the SEC could read rule 152 to say:

The phrase "transaction by an issuer not involving any public
offering" in Section 4(2) shall be deemed to apply to transactions

not involving any public offering at the time of said transaction

44. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (containing text of Interpretation One of
rule 152). Some commentators assert that rule 152 applies anytime an issuer makes a private
offering of securities and subsequently decides to make a public offering of securities. See 3
H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 4.14[5][a], at 4-214-4-215
(1988) (stating that rule 152 is applicable only if issuer subsequently decides to make public
offering); Stevenson, Integration and Private Placements, 19 Rav. oF SEc. & COMMODITIES
REo. 49, 55 (1986) (stating, without recitation of authority, that SEC interprets rule 152 to
apply only where decision to undertake public offering is made subsequent to private placement). No evidence exists, however, to show convincingly that the SEC adopted rule 152 to
assist issuers who make a good faith mistake about the amount of money needed for a
particular corporate project, or who fortuitously made their public offering decision subsequent
to their private placement. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text (discussing sparse
history of rule 152's purpose); infra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing inconsistency
of Interpretation One with doctrine of integration). No language is present in the SEC release
adopting rule 152 to support the idea that a shortsighted issuer of securities through a private
offering can escape integration if the issuer follows the private offering with a public offering.
See Securities Act Release No. 33-305 (Mar. 2, 1935) (available from SEC; reprinted in
Appendix) (adopting rule 152 and briefly stating purpose of rule). From the standpoint of
investor protection, no reason exists for the SEC to treat a shortsighted issuer who either
miscalculates the amount of capital that the issuer needs from a private offering or otherwise
"subsequently" decides to make a public offering differently from other issuers who may try
to circumvent the registration requirements.
45. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing five-factor test that SEC uses
to determine whether SEC should integrate separate offerings of securities).
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although subsequently thereto the issuer [decides to make a public
46
offering and/or] files a registrationstatement.
This interpretation of rule 152 would allow an issuer's private offering and
subsequent registered public offering of additional securities to escape
integration in any case where an issuer files a registration statement after
having made a private placement of securities. 47 Interpretation Two is a
broader interpretation of rule 152 than Interpretation One because under
Interpretation Two the SEC would focus on an issuer's objective act of
filing a registration statement. 4 1 In contrast, under Interpretation One the
focus is on the subjective intent ("decides") of an issuer during a particular
period.4 9 If rule 152 allows an issuer's private offering and subsequent public
offering to escape integration when the issuer subsequently registers securities
for a public offering, as Interpretation Two suggests, the rule would allow
the issuer to plan both a private offering of securities and a subsequent
public offering of additional securities before undertaking the initial private
offering." Additionally, Interpretation Two allows this sort of planning
whether the subsequent public offering is for a distinct purpose or for
exactly the same purpose as the private placement.
The following example illustrates the applicability of Interpretation Two.
Suppose Issuer B wishes to obtain $2,000,000. Issuer B plans to obtain
$1,000,000 through a section 4(2) private offering and $1,000,000 through
a public offering that would immediately follow completion of the private

46. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.152 (containing rule 152) (emphasis added); supra note 30 and
accompanying text (reprinting rule 152).
47. See infra notes 61-90 and accompanying text (discussing no-action letters in which
SEC interprets rule 152 to preclude integration of exempt private offering and subsequent
public offering if issuer registers public offering after having made private offering).
48. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text (discussing Interpretation One of rule
152, which precludes integration of private offering with subsequent public offering if issuer
decides to make public offering after undertaking private offering). If the SEC originally
intended rule 152 to preclude integration merely upon an issuer's filing of a registration
statement, no materials exist to clarify why the SEC included the phrase "decides to make a
public offering" in the rule. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (discussing sparse
history of rule 152). Logic requires that an issuer who subsequently files a registration statement
covering a public offering already has decided to make a public offering. See Securities Act
of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982) (requiring registration of public offerings). Thus, rule 152
might serve the rule's purpose if the rule stated:
The phrase "transaction by an issuer not involving any public offering" in Section
4(2) shall be deemed to apply to transactions not involving any public offering at
the time of said transaction although subsequently thereto the issuer files a registration
statement.
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.152 (1985) (containing rule 152); supra note 30 and accompanying text
(reprinting rule 152).
49. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text (discussing Interpretation One of rule
152, which precludes integration of private offering with subsequent public offering if issuer
decides to make public offering after issuer undertakes private offering).
50. See infra notes 70-82 and accompanying text (discussing SEC no-action letters in
which SEC apparently allows issuer to plan to make both private offering and subsequent
public offering before issuer undertakes private offering).
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offering. Interpretation Two would allow Issuer B to plan this sort of
staged financing arrangement and escape integration of the two offerings
simply by registering the subsequent public offering even if the two offerings
were part of a "single plan of financing" or were conducted for the identical
purpose and thus, absent the rule, might be integrated under the traditional
five-factor test. 5 1 In effect, under Interpretation Two integration is never an
issue if a particular kind of exempt transaction-a section 4(2) private
placement-is in fact followed by, however quickly,5 2 a particular kind of
financing-a registered public offering.5 3 Consequently, Interpretation Two
precludes integration of conventional two-round financings-although apparently not two or more section 4(2) placements followed by a registered
public offering because the private placements themselves might be integrated
with one another even if the private placements (or at least the last of them)
would not be integrated with the subsequent public offering. Interpretation
Two also apparently sanctions, and possibly invites, precisely what the SEC
long ago developed the doctrine of integration to prevent-the practice of
dividing what otherwise unquestionably would be one public offering into
first an exempt and then a registered component. Although sound policy
reasons may exist for reading the rule so broadly, the point for now is
simply that the SEC should be alert to the possibly unexpected breadth of
such an interpretation. In fact, recent no-action letters indicate that the
SEC now construes rule 152 to allow this sort of two-stage financing to
occur, but has done so without acknowledging the potential reach of its
interpretation and without clearly articulating either the rationale for that
interpretation or the interpretation's applicability or limitation in other
contexts. In short, Interpretation Two provides partial, if unexplained, relief
54
from the trap of integration.
C. Interpretation Three.
Lastly, the SEC could read rule 152 to state:
The phrase "transactions by an issuer not involving any public
offering" as used in Section 4(2) shall be deemed to apply to
transactions not involving any public offering at the time of said

51. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text (discussing Interpretation Two of rule
152); supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing five-factor test that SEC uses to resolve
integration questions).
52. Although under Interpretation Two integration is apparently never an issue if a
registered public offering follows a § 4(2) placement, whether the SEC, in light of the
word "subsequently," also could read rule 152 to allow an issuer to undertake a private
placement and a registered public offering simultaneously is not clear. See supra notes 46-51
and accompanying text (discussing Interpretation Two of rule 152). The question then becomes
how broadly the SEC is willing to interpret rule 152.
53. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text (discussing Interpretation Two of rule
152).
54. See infra notes 70-82 and accompanying text (discussing no-action letters in which
SEC allowed issuer to plan private offering and subsequent public offering).
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transactions although subsequently thereto the issuer decides to make
apublic offering and/orfile[s] a registrationstatement [(with respect
to the securities as were offered but not sold in the Section 4(2)
placement)] ."

Interpretation Three does not require choosing between an emphasis on the
subjective intent of the issuer-as in Interpretation One-or the objective
act of the issuer-as in Interpretation Two. Instead of implicitly referring
to a decision to make, or the filing of a registration statement pertaining
to, a separate subsequent public offering of additional securities, however,
Interpretation Three's language is much narrower and refers only to a public
offering of, and a registration statement covering, the securities offered but
not sold in the original private offering. Under this interpretation, and
unlike Interpretation Two, rule 152 alone would not preclude integration
of a separate registered public offering of additionalsecurities with an initial
private placement.56 Indeed, rule 152 would not apply at all to a situation
where an issuer undertakes a private offering, successfully completes the
private offering, and then follows the private offering with a registered
public offering. 57 Rather, the rule addresses only the situation where a
registered public offering follows a failed private offering, and the public
offering is simply an alternative outlet for the disposition of the unsold
securities, not additional securities.5
Illustrative of the application of Interpretation Three is this example.
Suppose Issuer C wishes to obtain $1,000,000 through a private placement.
Because Issuer C finds that it is able to sell only $250,000 worth of securities
through the private offering, Issuer C wants to sell the remaining $750,000
worth of securities through a registered public offering. Interpretation Three
of rule 152 would allow Issuer C to offer the unsold securities of the private
offering in a subsequent public offering without facing the risk that, with
hindsight, the earlier private placement will be deemed to "involve" the
public offering avenue chosen to dispose of the unsold securities, a risk
that might be substantial given that the offeror seeks to fulfill a single
capital-raising venture through alternative means. Without the rule in this
instance, the act of registering the unsold securities itself would be the event
creating what might be regarded as the second "offering" that then might
be "integrated" with the first "offering." Absent the registration of the

55. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.152 (1985) (containing rule 152) (emphasis added); supra note
30 and accompanying text (reprinting rule 152).
56. See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text (discussing applicability of rule 152 to
situation where issuer makes private offering but private offering fails, forcing issuer to
complete private offering by converting private offering to public offering).
57. See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text (discussing applicability of rule 152 to
situation where issuer makes private offering but private offering fails, forcing issuer to
complete private offering by converting private offering to public offering).
58. See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text (discussing applicability of rule 152 to
situation where issuer makes private offering but private offering fails, forcing issuer to
complete private offering by converting private offering to public offering).
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unsold securities, no "integration" risk exists because no later overture to
the capital markets occurs, only the failed private placement. Unfortunately,
Issuer C lacks the desired funds. Without the rule, an issuer who goes
forward with registration jeopardizes the exempt status of the earlier attempt
to sell the securities. Such an issuer is in a real bind and faces a Hobson's
choice: register and by that very act violate the Securities Act or halt the
funding effort and face financial failure. To regard the act of registering
securities as itself an event that vitiates an exemption for an earlier offering
of those securities seems anomalous. Therefore, Interpretation Three of the
rule solves Issuer C's dilemma and does so in a sensible manner. But under
this interpretation, that is all rule 152 does. Interpretation Three does not
address the question of whether the earlier private placement is deficient on
some other grounds. It does not address the question of whether the private
placement creates a "gun jumping" problem for the later registration. 9
Nor, importantly, does this interpretation do anything for issuers seeking
relief from integration in conventional multiround financing situations. For
that, issuers must continue to chart their course through the shoals of the
five-factor formula. 60 We believe Interpretation Three is correct.

III.

Tim REINCARNATION OF RuLE 152.

The SEC appears not to have addressed the function or scope of rule
152 during the first fifty years of the rule's existence. 6' Furthermore, only
one court has mentioned the rule, and then only briefly and without shedding
any light on the rule's proper construction.6 2 Only in 1986 did the SEC
begin using rule 152 to preclude integration in multiround financing situations when, beginning with Verticom, Inc.,63 the SEC issued the first of
several no-action letters construing the rule. 64 In Verticom the issuer had
successfully completed a section 4(2) private placement of convertible debt
and was considering a public offering of common stock the registration
statement for which would be filed as early as three or four months after
the completion date of the private placement. 65 The SEC essentially took

59. See infra notes 186-88 and accompanying text (discussing "gun-jumping" problem).
60. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's use of five-factor formula
to determine whether separate offerings should be integrated).
61. See infra notes 63-69 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's first interpretation
of rule 152 in no-action letter).
62. See Neuwirth Inv. Fund, Ltd. v. Swanton, 422 F. Supp. 1187, 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(noting that rule 152 provides that later registration or registered public offering does not
affect the nonpublic nature of original sale).
63. Verticom, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 12, 1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact

file).
64. See infra notes 65-90 and accompanying text (discussing no-action letters in which
SEC addressed rule 152).
65. Verticom, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 12, 1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact
file). Verticom was organized in March 1983 and had raised approximately $5 million in a
series of separate and discrete financing transactions. Id. Each of the separate transactions
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the position that rule 152 precluded integration of the successfully completed
private placement and the registered initial public offering. 6 In arriving at

its conclusion, the SEC explained that, by virtue of rule 152, the act of
filing a registration statement following a placement otherwise exempt under

section 4(2) does not vitiate the exemption.6 7 In grounding its conclusion
on an unprecedented reading of rule 152, the SEC found it unnecessary to
address the relevance of the traditional five-factor formula for determining
integration .6 Thus, in allowing an issuer to escape integration of a private
placement with a subsequent public offering of additional securities for
which a registration statement would be filed, the SEC adopted the broadest
69
possible interpretation of rule 152-Interpretation Two.

qualified for an exemption from registration pursuant to § 4(2) of the Securities Act. Id.
Verticom was a high technology start-up company and had received the majority of its funding
from professional investors. Id. Verticom scheduled the private placement at issue in Verticom
as the last installment in obtaining venture capital. Id. The private placement provided Verticom
with the capital that would enable Verticom to finance its operations until it turned the corner
in terms of profitability and cash flow. Id. Counsel for Verticom characterized Verticom's
financing process as contemplating two distinct financing plans. Id. The first financing plan
was the venture financing phase, in which Verticom expected venture capitalists to provide
funds for product development and the initial generation of revenues. Id. The second financing
plan of Verticom's capitalization process was the public financing phase. Id. For purposes of
the SEC's analysis of Verticom's situation, the SEC assumed that Verticom would undertake
the initial public offering within three to four months of the private placement of securities.
Id. In making a no-action request, Verticom advanced three arguments as to why the SEC
should not integrate the private offering with the subsequent public offering. Id. First, Verticom
argued that under the traditional five-factor formula, the offerings were independent because
the offerings (1) were not part of a single plan of financing and (2) the offerings were not
made for the same general purpose. Id.; see supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing
five-factor formula SEC uses to determine whether integration of securities should result).
Verticom conceded that an analysis of the remaining three factors did not yield a result
favorable to the Company's position. Verticom, supra; see supra note 25 and accompanying
text (discussing five-factor formula SEC uses to determine whether SEC should integrate
securities). Second, Verticom argued that rule 152 suggests that the filing of a registration
statement covering a public offering should not vitiate the § 4(2) exemption for an otherwise
qualifying private placement concluded prior to such filing. Verticom, supra. Finally, Verticom
advanced a policy argument. Id. Specifically, Verticom argued that no compelling reason
existed for integrating the two offerings. Id. Verticom stated that the two offerings simply did
not represent an attempt to circumvent the registration requirements of the Securities Act
through the misuse of the § 4(2) exemption. Id.; see supra note 7 and accompanying text
(discussing reasons for registration requirement of Securities Act).
66. Verticom, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 12, 1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library,
Noact file).
67. Id.
68. Id.; see supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's use of five-factor
formula to determine whether SEC should integrate separate offerings of securities and, thus,
require registration of all involved offerings).
69. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's analysis of integration
in Verticom); supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text (discussing Interpretation Two of rule
152, which would preclude integration of private offering and subsequent public offering if
issuer files registration statement for public offering after issuer undertakes private offering).
The SEC applied essentially the same interpretation of rule 152 in The Immune Response
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The SEC again interpreted rule 152 in Vulture Petroleum Corp.70 In its
no-action request, Vulture Petroleum Corporation sought the views of the
SEC concerning the possible integration of a future registered public offering
of common stock with a currently contemplated sale of common stock
pursuant to rule 506 of regulation D.7 The issuer cited the Verticom letter
in support of its request and argued that, because rule 506 is grounded in
section .4(2) of the Securities Act, rule 152 ought to apply to prevent
integration. 72 The SEC agreed with the request, taking the position that rule
152 precluded integration of the proposed placement of securities under rule
506 with the later registered public offering. 73 Although the SEC did not
state specifically the reason for interpreting rule 152 as it did, apparently

the SEC construed the rule to categorically preclude integration of a section
4(2) private offering and a subsequent public offering of additional securities
for which an issuer files a registration statement.7 4 In short, once again the
SEC adopted Interpretation Two of the rule."5
The facts in Vulture Petroleum appear to differ from the facts in

Verticom in one important respect. Vulture Petroleum involved an issuer's
contemplation of both a private offering and a subsequent public offering

Corp. as the SEC had applied in Verticom. See The Immune Response Corp., SEC No-Action
Letter (Nov..2, 1987) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (interpreting rule 152 to preclude
integration of private placement and subsequent proposed registered public offering). In
Immune Response The Immune Response Corporation requested that the SEC take a no-action
position with respect to the integration of the company's completed private placement of
securities and a proposed initial public offering to take place within six months of the private
placement. Id. Immune Response argued that, as in Verticom, rule 152 should be available to
prevent the company's subsequent filing of a registration statement relating to the company's
proposed public offering from vitiating the company's exemption for the private placement.
Id; see supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's interpretation of rule 152
in Verticom). In taking a no-action position and reiterating the SEC's prior statements regarding
the rule, the SEC relied on rule 152 and stated that the SEC should not integrate the private
placement with the proposed registered public offering. Immune Response, supra.
70. Vulture Petroleum Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 78,407, at 77,319 (Dec. 31, 1986).
71. Id. Vulture Petroleum was wholly-owned by three individuals. Id. Vulture Petroleum
planned to offer common stock solely to certain Vulture Petroleum directors and less than 35
other persons in a limited offering that would qualify under rule 506 of regulation D of the
Securities Act. Id. In its letter of inquiry Vulture Petroleum explained that it might undertake
a registered initial public offering within six months of the private offering. Id. Vulture
Petroleum argued that, under rule 152, the filing of a registration statement following an
offering otherwise exempt under § 4(2) should not vitiate the exemption under § 4(2). Id. at
77,320.
72. Id. at 77,320.
73. Id.
74. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's interpretation of rule
152 in Verticom to preclude integration of private offering and subsequent public offering if
issuer registers public offering after issuer completes private offering).
75. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text (discussing Interpretation Two of rule
152, which precludes integration of private offering of securities and subsequent registered
public offering of additional securities upon issuer's filing of registration statement).
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before either offering had taken place.7 6 In Verticom the issuer already had
completed a private offering before requesting that the SEC take a noaction position with respect to a subsequent public offering.7 7 Arguably, in
Verticom because the decision to go forward with the public offering was
still somewhat uncertain at the time of the no-action request-although the
public financing phase had been considered prior thereto-the issuer had
decided to make a public offering, if at all, only subsequently to completion
of the private offering. Therefore, Verticom might be viewed as reflecting
the more cautious, uncertain, and less useful Interpretation One. 78 In Vulture
Petroleum, however, any doubts concerning the irrelevance of an issuer's
subjective intent were dispelled. 79 In fact, the position in Vulture Petroleum
was extended somewhat in The Immune Response Corp.80 In Immune
Response, even though the issuer initially relied on rule 505 for the issuer's
private placement preceding a public offering, where rule 506 was also
available the SEC used rule 152 to preclude integration. 8' Thus, in allowing
an issuer to plan both a private placement and a public offering of additional
securities to immediately follow the private placement with no danger of
the SEC integrating the two transactions, the SEC has extended its position
taken in Verticom and Vulture Petroleum and again embraced the broadest
82
possible construction of the rule-Interpretation Two.

76. Vulture Petroleum Corp., SEC No-Action Letter [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 78,407, at 77,319 (Dec. 31, 1986); supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text
(discussing facts in Vulture Petroleum); cf. Verticom, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 12,
1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (issuer requested views of SEC regarding integration
of completed private offering with possible future public offering that issuer would undertake
within three to four months of private offering); supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text
(discussing Verticom no-action letter).
77. Verticom, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 12, 1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact
file); see supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text (discussing facts in Verticom).
78. See supra note 39-45 and accompanying text (discussing Interpretation One of rule
152, which precludes integration of private offering of securities and subsequent registered
public offering of additional securities if issuer decides to undertake public offering after
undertaking private offering); supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's
analysis in Verticom).
79. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's views in Vulture
Petroleum).
80. See The Immune Response Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Nov. 2, 1987) (LEXIS,
Fedsec library, Noact file) (interpreting rule 152 to preclude integration of private offering
and subsequent proposed registered public offering); supra note 69 (discussing SEC's analysis
in Immune Response).
81. See The Immune Response Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Nov. 2, 1987) (LEXIS,
Fedsec library, Noact file) (allowing rule 152 to preclude integration where issuer initially relied
on rule 505 but rule 506 also was available).
82. See supra notes 70-80 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's interpretation of rule
152 in Vulture Petroleum); supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text (discussing Interpretation
Two of rule 152, which precludes integration of private offering and subsequent registered
public offering of additional securities upon issuer's filing of registration statement covering
public offering). In a no-action letter that the SEC issued before Vulture Petroleum, the SEC
had allowed essentially the same result that the SEC allowed in Vulture Petroleum. See BBI
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A more recent no-action letter concerning rule 152 is Vintage Group,
Inc.83 In Vintage Group, Vintage Group, Inc. requested the views of the
SEC regarding integration if, immediately upon termination of a rule 506
offering that the corporation currently was conducting, the corporation
commenced a public offering under regulation E. The SEC took a noaction position with respect to the request. 85 In doing so, the SEC summarily
concluded that, under rule 152, a public offering that follows an offering

Assocs., SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 29, 1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (interpreting
rule 152 to preclude integration of proposed sale of assets and certain liquidation transactions
with subsequent registered public offering). In BBI Associates the SEC considered the possible
integration of a proposed sale of assets and certain liquidation transactions with a later
registered public offering. Id. In BBI Associates the SEC determined that rule 152 precludes
integration when an issuer files a registration statement following a private offering. Id. In
reaching its conclusion the SEC relied on its position that, under rule 152, the filing of a
registration statement subsequent to an offering otherwise exempt from registration under §
4(2) does not vitiate the exemption provided by § 4(2). Id. The SEC's position in BBIAssociates
assumed that the proposed transactions would be exempt from registration under § 4(2) of the
Act. Id. As in Verticom, the SEC did not address BBI Associates' arguments concerning the
traditional five-factor formula for determining integration in light of the SEC's conclusions
concerning rule 152. See id. (stating that SEC found discussing traditional five-factor formula
unnecessary in light of SEC's findings based on rule 152); supra note 68 and accompanying
text (considering SEC's failure to discuss traditional five-factor formula in determining whether
SEC should integrate separate offerings in Verticom). The SEC in BBI Associates, broadening
the SEC's view in Verticom, interpreted rule 152 to allow an issuer to contemplate both a
prospective private offering and a subsequent public offering without requiring integration of
the two issues. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's analysis in
Verticom no-action letter).
83. Vintage Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 78,700, at 77,978 (Apr. 11, 1988).
84. Id. In Vintage Group, Vintage Group, Inc. was a Colorado corporation that became
a public company in 1983 and elected in June 1986 to have the SEC treat Vintage Group as
a business development company pursuant to the Investment Company Act of 1940. Id. At
the time of Vintage Group's inquiry, Vintage Group was engaged in an offering of its securities
under rule 506 of regulation D. Id. In reliance on Verticom and Vulture Petroleum, Vintage
Group argued that rule 152 should preclude integration of Vintage Group's regulation D
offering and its subsequent regulation E offering. Id.; see supra notes 63-69 and accompanying
text (discussing SEC's treatment of rule 152 in Verticom) and notes 70-82 and accompanying
text (discussing SEC's treatment of rule 152 in Vulture Petroleum). In explaining that offerings
made pursuant to regulation E are public offerings and, therefore, subject to exclusion from
integration under rule 152, Vintage Group noted that the SEC promulgated regulation E in
1958 under § 3(c) of the Securities Act and amended regulation E in 1984 to include business
development companies within the group of companies that may rely on the exemption. Vintage
Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,700,
at 77,978 (Apr. 11, 1988); see Investment Company Act Release No. 13,903, [1984 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,609, at 86,745 (Apr. 25, 1984) (proposing amendment
to regulation E to include business development companies within group of companies that
may rely on regulation E exemption); Amendments to the Offering Exemption Under Regulation
E, Securities Act Release No. 33-6546, 31 SEC Docket 292. (Aug. 30, 1984) (adopting
amendment to regulation E to include business development companies within group of
companies that may rely on regulation E exemption).
85. Vintage Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 78,700, at 77,978 (Apr. 11, 1988).
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exempt under rule 506 need not be integrated with the rule 506 transaction
and, accordingly, would not vitiate the exemption under rule 506.86 As in
Vulture Petroleum, in Vintage Group the SEC allowed a public offering to
follow a private offering without integration of the two offerings even
though the issuer did not decide to make the public offering subsequent to

completion of the private offering but made that decision prior to completion
of the private offering.

7

Again, Interpretation Two was embraced."

Taken together, these path-breaking no-action letters make clear that
the SEC's current interpretation of rule 152 allows an issuer to plan in
advance a public offering of securities to follow soon after a private
placement without fear that the SEC will integrate the two offerings.8 9

Moreover, in this setting the SEC simply has discarded the five-factor
formula. Through these no-action letters the SEC appears to have partially
addressed the longstanding concerns associated with multiround financings,

providing assurance that, at least in those capital transactions structured as
section 4(2) exemptions followed by registered public offerings, the concept

of integration will not be employed to upset the issuer's capital financing
plans.9 Welcome though this long-awaited development might be for those
facing the nagging practical difficulties created by the doctrine of integration,

the question remains whether the SEC is correct in its interpretation of rule
152.

IV. Is THE SEC's CURRENT INTERPRETATION OF RULE 152 CORUCT?
From a linguistic viewpoint, the SEC's reading of rule 152 may be
correct, a fact that largely has escaped commentators and securities profes86. Id.
87. Id.; see supra notes 70-82 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's treatment of
rule 152 in Vulture Petroleum).
88. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text (discussing Interpretation Two of rule
152, which would allow issuer to plan to make both private offering and subsequent public
offering before issuer undertakes private offering). In the SEC's most recent no-action letter
concerning rule 152, the SEC re-affirmed its view that rule 152 precludes integration when a
public offering follows a private offering. See Country First Bank, SEC No-Action Letter
(Mar. 31, 1989) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (stating that, under rule 152, public
offering following offering otherwise exempt under rule 506 of regulation D does not vitiate
rule 506 exemption).
89. See supra notes 61-88 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's current interpretation
of rule 152). In the third edition of Louis Loss' monumental treatise on securities regulation,
L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, SEcUrrmEs REGULATION (3d ed. 1989), Professors Loss and Seligman
state, in discussing rule 152, that "the Commission staff has insisted that the subsequent public
offering not be planned before or simultaneously with the earlier private placement." Id. at
1225. They also state that the staff "has permitted a subsequent public offering to be
'contemplated' as long as it is not 'planned' in a more formal sense." Id. at 1225 n.27. We
do not think the staff is making that distinction, either expressly or in the broad reading given
rule 152 in its cryptic no-action responses. Moreover, that distinction is too subtle to be made
with any certainty. Either the SEC makes the distinction, with the result that issuers will shy
away from reliance on the rule, or the SEC ignores the distinction, with the result that it lacks
meaning and ought to be discarded.
90. See supra notes 61-88 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's current interpretation
of rule 152).
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sionals. After all, Interpretation Two is a perfectly accurate rendition to

one who examines only the literal text of the rule. 9' Still, at a time when
the integration doctrine has come under renewed attack, this fortuitous
"discovery" that rule 152 really does handily settle a portion of the

integration enigma should be received critically, and for several reasons.
A. First, although a portion of the rule's language does accommodate

the SEC's interpretation, the SEC is ignoring other language of the rule
that might be read to require an analysis of whether an issuer who decides
to make a public offering has done so before or after the issuer has made

a private placement. 92 As Interpretation One illustrates, and as most pre-

Verticom commentators seem to think, rule 152 could be read to preclude
integration of a private offering and a subsequent public offering only if

an issuer makes a private offering and then subsequently decides to make
a public offering. 93 This interpretation obviously does not address at all the

multiround financing dilemma and is subject to other problems as well.
Moreover, in our view this interpretation, although apparently the dominant
pre-Verticom interpretation of rule 152, which is precisely the reason the
rule has rested in obscurity all these decades, is also wrong. Nonetheless,
here the point is simply that, while portions of the rule's language support
the SEC's current interpretation, the rule can be, and long has been, read
in quite another way. 94

B. Second, a further argument that the SEC currently may be misinterpreting, or at least is dramatically reinterpreting, rule 152 is the fact that
in certain instances the SEC could have applied the rule but failed to do

91. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text (discussing Interpretation Two of rule
152, which would allow issuer to plan to make both private offering and subsequent public
offering before issuer undertakes private offering); supra note 30 and accompanying text
(reprinting rule 152).
92. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (reprinting rule 152); supra notes 39-45
and accompanying text (discussing Interpretation One of rule 152, which would preclude
integration of private offering and subsequent public offering if issuer decides to make public
offering after issuer already has made private offering).
93. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text (discussing Interpretation One of rule
152, which would preclude integration of private offering and subsequent public offering if
issuer decides to make public offering after issuer already has made private offering).
Many commentators believe that the rule precludes integration only when an issuer makes
a private offering and subsequently decides to make a public offering. See supra note 44
(noting commentators who interpret rule 152 to preclude integration if issuer decides to make
public offering after completing private offering). Commentators also recognize the ambiguity
that the rule creates. See H. BLootmETrrsA, supra note 44, at 4-215 (discussing questions that
rule 152 raises); Shapiro & Sachs, Integration Under the Securities Act: Once an Exemption,
Not Always ... , 31 MD. L. REv. 3, 17 (1971) (noting ambiguity of rule 152's language);
Deaktor, Integration of Securities Offerings, 31 U. FLA. L. REv. 465, 497 n.206 (1979)
(explaining different interpretations of rule 152). Many commentators focus only on the words
of rule 152 rather than on whdt purpose in 1935 the SEC originally intended the rule to serve.
Thus, the questions that many commentators have asked concerning rule 152-questions that
grow out of Interpretation One-are the wrong questions.
94. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text (discussing inconsistency of SEC's
current interpretation of rule 152 with full text of rule's language).
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so. 95 One such recent opportunity where the SEC could have applied rule
152 but did not do so arose in LaserFax, Inc.9 6 In LaserFax the issuer
proposed to make a placement of subordinated convertible debentures
pursuant to rules 505 and 506 within six months of the consummation of
a private placement of common stock made in reliance on an unspecified
rule under regulation D of the Securities Act. 97 LaserFax further proposed
to make a registered public offering of common stock within six months
of the proposed debenture offering. 9 LaserFax requested a no-action letter
from the SEC as to whether the SEC would integrate the placement of
debentures with either the earlier private placement or the later public
offering or both. 9 The SEC declined to take a no-action position with
respect to the integration of the debenture placement with either the earlier
private placement or the proposed subsequent public offering.' °° The SEC,
however, did not even consider the application of rule 152.101 Rather, the
SEC applied the traditional five-factor formula used to resolve integration
questions. 0 2 Certainly, rule 152 had no bearing on whether the SEC would
integrate the earlier regulation D common stock placement with the debenture offering.10 3 The rule addresses only the situation of a section 4(2)
offering followed by a registered public offering.' °4 The debenture offering
was not a public offering. Moreover, LaserFax did not state clearly that
the earlier private placement of common stock was a rule 506 placement
grounded in section 4(2) rather than a rule 504 or rule 505 placement
grounded in section 3(b).105 Consequently, the SEC had no alternative under
existing law but to apply the vague five-factor test.
Although the SEC could not apply rule 152 to preclude integration of
the offering of debentures with the earlier private placement, the SEC
possibly could have relied on rule 152 to prevent integration of the debenture
placement with the subsequent public offering of common stock. It is not
completely clear why the SEC did not apply rule 152, especially in light of
Verticom, which was issued just a year after LaserFax. One possible reason
95. See infra notes 96-129 and accompanying text (discussing situations in which SEC
and courts could have applied rule 152 but failed to do so).
96. LaserFax, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 78,136, at 76,614 (Aug. 15, 1985).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.at 76,615.
100. Id.
101. See id. (failing to consider rule 152).
102.

Id.; see supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing five-factor formula that

SEC uses to resolve integration issues).
103. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.152 (1982); supra note 30 and accompanying text (reprinting
rule 152). By its terms, rule 152 applies at most only to situations involving § 4(2) offerings
and public offerings). See id.
104. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing application of rule 152).
105. See LaserFax, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1985-86 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH)
78,136, at 76,615 (Aug. 15, 1985) (failing to state whether earlier private
placement was rule 506 placement rather than rule 504 or 505 placement).
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is that the issuer did not state clearly whether the issuer would make the

debenture placement exclusively in reliance on rule 506 rather than rule 505
as well.' °6 Because rule 506 is grounded in section 4(2) but rule 505 is
grounded in section 3(b), failure to clarify that point would warrant SEC
refusal to conclude that rule 152 applied. That appears clearly to be the
case in one letter, issued shortly after LaserFax, in which the SEC did not
concur that private placements need not be integrated with subsequent
public offerings. 107 Another possible reason might be that the issuer's counsel

did not base the no-action request on rule 152, and the SEC was not going
to make the case for the issuer. Finally, it may not yet have dawned on
the SEC to give rule 152 the reading given shortly thereafter in Verticom.

Whatever might have been the reason or reasons for not applying rule 152
to the situation in LaserFax,0° while later applying rule 152 to somewhat

similar situations, the SEC, at least in retrospect, may have acted inconsistently with respect to the rule.' °9

An earlier instance in which the SEC could have applied its recent
reading of rule 152 but failed to do so arose in Cameron Industries, Inc.'10
Cameron involved a proceeding to determine whether the SEC should issue

a stop order suspending the effectiveness of a registration statement that
the issuer had filed with respect to a proposed public offering of common
stock."' Within the six-month period immediately prior to the month in
106. See id. (failing to state whether LaserFax was to make debenture placement exclusively
in reliance on rule 506 rather than rule 505 as well).
107. See Financial Independence Inv. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (LEXIS, Fedsec
library, Noact file) (Oct. 30, 1985) (failing to clarify whether placement was made in reliance
on rule 506 rather than rule 504 or rule 505 as well).
108. One commentator asserts that the SEC used LaserFaxto confirm the SEC's position
that rule 152 applies only where the decision to undertake a public offering is made subsequent
to the private placement. See Stevenson, supra note 44, at 55. After Verticom, however, it is
clear that the SEC does not hold-if it ever did-that position.
109. See supra notes 95-108 and accompanying text (discussing inconsistency of SEC's
application of rule 152). Although the SEC may have acted inconsistently with respect to rule
152, Mary E.T. Beach, Associate Director of the Division of SEC's Division of Corporation
Finance, has defended the position taken by the SEC in LaserFax. See Real Estate Syndicators
Ask Staff To Consider Reg D Changes, [Jan.-June] 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), No. 17,
at 590-91 (April 25, 1986) (discussing SEC's rationale in LaserFax). In defending the SEC's
position in LaserFax, Beach explained that the staff always has focused on the purpose and
the type of securities to be issued in multiple offerings to reach a conclusion on whether the
SEC should integrate the offerings. Id. at 591. Beach further explained that in the LaserFax
no-action request LaserFax did not identify the portion of regulation D on which the issuer
proposed to rely in making the private offering. Id. In distinguishing the no-action position
that the SEC took in Verticom from the position that the SEC took in LaserFax, Beach stated
that the issuer in Verticom specified which part of regulation D it proposed to rely upon in
making the private offering. Id. In addition, Beach explained that, in contrast to the requestor
in LaserFax,counsel for Verticom argued that rule 152 should apply to the proposed offerings.
Id. In response to Verticom's request in Verticom, the SEC stated that the SEC would not
focus on the "subsequently thereto" language in rule 152 to determine the issuer's state of
mind at the time the issuer made the private offering. Id.
110. 39 S.E.C. 540 (1959).
111. Cameron Indus., Inc., 39 S.E.C. 540, 540-41 (1959).
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which the issuer filed the registration statement, the issuer had sold 291,500
shares of common stock." 2 Of the 291,500 shares, the issuer sold 23,500
shares directly to three persons for approximately $10,000." 3 The issuer
distributed the remaining 268,000 shares to various persons through the
efforts of a promoter.1 4 In the issuer's public offering prospectus the issuer
stated that the prior sales of the 291,500 shares of common stock had been
exempt from registration under what is now section 4(2) as a private
5
placement of securities."
In a proceeding before the full Commission the Division of Corporate
Finance (the Division) argued that all of the sales of common stock pursuant
to the alleged private placements were in fact a part of the issue of common
stock that the issuer publicly offered pursuant to the issuer's registration
statement." 6 Thus, the Division argued that the SEC should integrate the
prior private offerings and the subsequent public offering." 7 In contrast,
the issuer argued that the sales of the 23,500 shares constituted an exempt
pre-underwriting offering created to raise funds to pay general corporate
expenses, including the costs incurred in connection with the contemplated
public offering." 8 The issuer further argued that the sale of the remaining
268,000 shares was also a separate financing transaction exempt under
current section 4(2)." a In spite of the issuer's arguments, the SEC held that
the issuer sold the 23,500 shares in connection with and as part of a plan
for the public distribution of the issuer's securities. 20 With respect to the
remaining 268,000 shares, the SEC further found the issuance and distribution of the 268,000 shares to be an "integral part of the public offering
of registrant's shares proposed pursuant to the registration statement filed
shortly thereafter."' 2' As a result of these findings, the SEC integrated the
two prior private placements into the subsequent public offering and held
that the exemption claimed in the issuer's prospectus for the prior transactions was not available. 2 2 The SEC held, therefore, that the prior sales
violated the registration provisions of the Securities Act. 23 Accordingly, the
SEC found the issuer's registration statement to be materially misleading
because the statement falsely represented that the sales of the 291,500 shares
of the issuer's stock were exempt from registration and failed to disclose
l
the issuer's contingent liabilities resulting therefrom.'

112. Id. at 545-46.
113. Id.at 546.
114. Id.

115. Id.at 545-46.
116. Id.at 546.
117. Id.
118. Id.

119. Id.at 545-46.
120. Id.at 546.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.

Id.
Id.

Id.
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Thus, in Cameron the full Securities and Exchange Commission integrated an issuer's private placements of securities with a subsequent registered public offering of additional securities without regard to, or even
mentioning, the effect of rule 152 on the situation.125 The SEC staff,
however, now has matter-of-factly applied rule 152 to preclude integration

of a private offering and a subsequent public offering on the rationale that
the plain language of the rule prevents integration of the transactions where
a registration statement for the public offering has been filed. 2 6 Applying
the staff's reasoning that rule 152 bars integration under those circumstances
2 7
to the facts of Cameron, one is hard pressed to reconcile the two outcomes.
Perhaps, as with LaserFax, the rule was not presented in defense and was
otherwise unknown to the SEC, or was thought not to apply to such a
situation. 28 While traditional integration factors, though not necessarily
sound policy, indicate that the SEC correctly integrated the financing
transactions in Cameron, the SEC staff must reconcile its current interpretation of rule 152 with the SEC's holding in Cameron. 29 One of the two
is wrong.

125. See id. at 545-46 (failing to discuss rule 152); supra notes 110-124 and accompanying
text (discussing SEC's holding in Cameron).
126. See supra notes 61-90 and accompanying text (discussing no-action letters in which
SEC took position that rule 152 precludes integration of private offering and subsequent public
offering if issuer files registration statement for public offering after having made private
offering).
127. See supra notes 110-124 and accompanying text (discussing facts in Cameron); supra
notes 61-90 and accompanying text (discussing SEC staff's position in no-action letters that
rule 152 precludes integration of private offering and subsequent public offering when issuer
files registration statement for subsequent public offering).
128. See supra notes 95-109 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's failure to apply
rule 152 in LaserFax).
129. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing traditional five-factor test that
SEC uses to determine whether SEC should integrate separate offerings of securities); supra
notes 61-90 and accompanying text (discussing SEC staff's position that rule 152 precludes
integration of private offering and subsequent public offering when issuer files registration
statement for subsequent public offering). But see Shapiro & Sachs, supra note 93, at 17
(arguing that Cameron's factual scenario falls outside protection that rule 152 affords). Shapiro
& Sachs assert that Cameron falls outside the scope of rule 152's protection. See id. at 17
(arguing that rule 152 does not apply to facts of Cameron). These commentators note that
the issuer in Cameron reached a decision with an underwriter relative to the exact terms of
the proposed public offering prior to the time that the illegal sales were made. Id. The
commentators, writing in 1971, wrongly assume that the SEC only allows rule 152 to preclude
integration of a private offering and a subsequent public offering if the issuer decides to make
the public offering after the issuer already has made the private offering of securities-i.e.,
that Interpretation One is correct. Cf. supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text (discussing
Interpretation One of rule 152, which would preclude integration of private offering and
subsequent public offering if issuer decides to make public offering after issuer already has
undertaken private offering). The SEC, however, has stated that rule 152 precludes integration
of a private offering and a subsequent public offering merely when an issuer files the registration
statement for the subsequent public offering. See supra notes 61-90 and accompanying text
(discussing no-action letters in which SEC staff took position that rule 152 precludes integration
of private offering and subsequent public offering when issuer files registration statement for
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The LaserFax and Cameron situations emphasize the point that either
the SEC has recently "rediscovered" rule 152 or that the SEC is using the

rule for the wrong situation by deploying the rule in the multiround financing
context. 30 The SEC, however, is not completely to blame for the present
confusion surrounding the proper interpretation of rule 152.11' Understand-

able pressures from the securities bar for a wholesale revisiting of the
nettlesome way in which the integration doctrine complicates capital for-

mation, pressures that securities regulators have largely not heeded, aid in
32
explaining the rule's sudden arrival in the multiround financing setting.
For some time members of the securities bar have been especially hopeful

that the SEC will refrain from integrating private offerings made in antic-

ipation of initial public offerings, largely on policy grounds. 3 3 Lacking any
relief from the regulatory authorities, securities lawyers sought refuge from
continuing uncertainty in an existing rule, albeit an obscure rule, that the
lawyers could use to buttress their policy-based arguments. 3 4 A closer review

and novel way in which rule
of the Verticom letter bears out the creative
35
152 was interpreted to serve that end.

Verticom was apparently the first instance in which an issuer's lawyer
cited rule 152 to persuade the SEC staff to take a no-action position with
regard to whether a private placement and a subsequent public offering
should be integrated. 36 To convince the SEC to apply rule 152, counsel for
Verticom explained that "one apparent effect" of the rule is to allow an
issuer who had begun to undertake a private offering of securities to register

the securities of the private offering for a public offering without incurring37
liability because the issuer first began to undertake the offering privately.

subsequent public offering). Because we believe both Shapiro and Sachs' Intepretation One
and the SEC's Interpretation Two are wrong, we believe that Shapiro and Sachs are right
about Cameron falling outside of rule 152, but that they are right for the wrong reason.
130. See supra notes 96-109 and accompanying text (discussing SEC staff's analysis in
LaserFax);supra notes 110-129 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's analysis in Cameron).
131. See supra notes 31-60 and accompanying text (di~cussing reasons for confusion
surrounding rule 152's application).
132. See infra notes 133-141 and accompanying text (discussing pressures from securities
bar that help explain SEC's current interpretation of rule 152).
133. See Stevenson, supra note 44, at 55.
134. See infra notes 136-141 and accompanying text (discussing lawyers' use of rule 152
to persuade SEC that SEC should not integrate private offering that issuer makes to raise seed
capital with later initial public offering).
135. See infra notes 136-141 and accompanying text (discussing means by which counsel
in Verticom persuaded SEC staff to take no-action position).
136. See Verticom, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 12, 1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library,
Noact file) (using rule 152 to support argument that SEC staff should take no-action position);
supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text (discussing Verticom no-action letter).
137. Verticom, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 12, 1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact
file). We think there is little doubt the "one apparent effect" of rule 152 that counsel for
Verticom in Verticom mentions is the only effect of the rule. Essentially, this interpretation
of rule 152 would allow an issuer who makes a failed private offering of securities to complete
the private offering by registering the unsold securities for a public offering and incur no
liability for first having undertaken the offering privately. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text (discussing Interpretation Three).
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In other words, Verticom's counsel seemed to acknowledge Interpretation
Three of rule 152 as one "apparent effect," but did not concede that such
an interpretation was, as we believe clearly is the case, the sum and substance
of the rule.' 38 Instead, counsel for Verticom went on to argue that "a
reasonable construction of the rule" suggests that the filing of a registration
statement covering a public offering should not vitiate the section 4(2)
exemption for an otherwise qualifying private placement that the issuer
concluded prior to such filing.'39 In spite of wholly misinterpreting rule 152
to cover something the rule was not designed to address-the mezzanine
financing situation in Verticom-counsel for Verticom succeeded in persuading the SEC to apply the rule.' 40 Moreover, since Verticom the SEC
has continued to apply rule 152 to multiround financing situations and
shows no signs of reversing that trend.'14 By thus rising to the issuer's
tantalizing bait, the SEC has done what it may have wanted to do for some
time but lacked the ingenuity to accomplish-to address, at least in part,
the abiding integration concerns of the practicing securities bar. The SEC
now has done so, but only by abruptly reversing the direction of LaserFax
and Cameron and, more important, by distorting the original purpose of
rule 152.
C. In addition to challenging the linguistic and precedential underpinnings of the SEC's new interpretation of rule 152, a third argument that
the SEC misunderstands the intended scope of the rule comes from the
language of the release adopting the rule. 42 The release takes care to explain
that the rule is intended to clarify that, if an issuer makes a section 4(2)
placement "prior to the filing of the registration statement... under circumstances which did not necessitate registration or contemplate registration. . . " such initial private offerings do not by the "fact of registration
43
become the type of offerings which are prohibited by the Securities Act.'
Furthermore, the release states that the rule allows issuers "who have

138. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text (discussing Interpretation Three of rule

152).
139. Verticom, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 12, 1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact
file). The rule 152 argument that counsel for Verticom pressed in Verticom is understandable
in light of the nonexistent history of the rule's application. See supra notes 32-34 and
accompanying text (discussing sparse history of rule 152). This lack of history regarding the
rule, however, also indicates that the multiround financing situation, such as arose in Verticom,
is the incorrect situation for application of the rule. Had the SEC originally intended rule 152
to apply to the multiround financing situation, no doubt the SEC would have made this clear
during the first fifty years of the rule's existence.
140. Verticom, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 12, 1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact
file); see supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's interpretation of rule 152
in Verticom).
141. See supra notes 61-90 and accompanying text (discussing no-action letters in which
SEC has interpreted rule 152 to preclude integration of private offering and subsequent public
offering when issuer files registration statement for subsequent public offering).
142. See Securities Act Release No. 33-305 (Mar. 2, 1935) (available from SEC; reprinted
in Appendix) (adopting rule 152 to Securities Act).
143. Id.
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contemplated or begun to undertake a private offering to register the
securities without incurring any risk of liability as a consequence of having
first contemplated or begun to undertake a private offering."' 44 This language pretty clearly indicates that the rule refers to a registration of the
securities that an issuer first offers privately instead of a registration covering
other securities in a separate public offering. 14 1 Moreover, the release adopting rule 152 initially explains that the rule's purpose is to define "transactions not involving any public offering" made prior to an issuer's filing of
a registration statement. 46 Consequently, the release does not directly address the issue of integrating separate financings so much as state that the
character of a private placement as "private" is not altered by a later
registered public re-offering of that portion of the securities offered, but
not sold, privately. 47 In other words, under this interpretation of rule 152,
the SEC will not recharacterize a private offering under section 4(2) as
"involving" a public offering if an issuer subsequently files a registration
statement covering the securities of the private offering in a subsequent
public offering in order, essentially, to salvage a single financing transaction
that began as a failed private placement. 4 Thus, the original release
addresses what in the financial doldrums of 1935 might have been viewed
as a pressing need-the dilemma of the issuer with a "sticky" private
placement. So read, the release supports a more modest interpretation of
rule 152-Interpretation Three-rather than the SEC's newly found, broader
interpretation. 149
144. Id. (emphasis added).
145. See id. (discussing purposes of rule 152); supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text
(discussing Interpretation Three of rule 152, which allows issuer of private offering of securities
to file registration statement covering private offering securities for public offering without
affecting original exemption under § 4(2)).
146. Securities Act Release No. 33-305 (Mar. 2, 1935) (available from SEC; reprinted in
Appendix).
147. See id. (stating purposes of rule 152).
148. See supra notes 142-147 and accompanying text (discussing language of release
adopting rule 152). One commentator also indicates that the SEC originally intended rule 152
to apply to an issuer who makes a private offering of securities and then wishes to transform
the private offering into a public offering. See L. Loss, 1 SEcuarr Es REGULATION 688-89 (2d
ed. 1961) (discussing applicability of rule 152 to issuer who makes private offering and
subsequently decides to transform private offering into public offering). Loss states that rule
152 is a special rule that "affords a locus poenitentiae to an issuer which starts with a private
offering and subsequently decides to make a public offering or file a registration statement."
Id. at 689 (first and third emphases in original; second emphasis added). Although not entirely
clear-especially in light of the more ambiguous discussion of the function of rule 152 found
in the third edition of the treatise, see L. Loss & J. SEUiGMAN, supra note 89, at 1225-26Loss' interpretation of rule 152 appears to comport with our Interpretation Three and,
therefore, suggests that the rule should preclude integration for an issuer who makes a private
offering and who subsequently decides to turn the "private" offering into a public offering
and thus subsequently files a registration statement to finish the private offering. The subsequent
decision to register the securities not sold in the private placement must be distinguished from
a subsequent decision to make a public offering of additional securities after a successful §
4(2) placement. The latter reading is Interpretation One, which we believe is wrong.
149. See Securities Act Release No. 33-305 (Mar. 2, 1935) (available from SEC; reprinted
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D. Support for a more restrictive reading of rule 152 is also found in
a review of the SEC's thinking on the nascent integration issue at the time
the rule was promulgated. The origins of the integration concept often are
traced to an early Federal Trade Commission letter in which an issuer
sought the views of the FTC.0 Pending the effectiveness of a registration
statement an issuer proposed to sell securities to residents of the state in
which the issuer was incorporated and was doing business in reliance on
what is now section 3(a)(1l). 151 The issuer contemplated that, after the
registration statement became effective, it would sell to nonresidents in a
public offering.5 2 The FTC stated that section 3(a)(l1) required an issuer
to sell the "entire issue" to residents of a single state and that the posteffective sales to nonresidents in the public offering would violate that
condition." 3
In one sense it might be said that the FTC "integrated" two separate
offerings. Yet, beyond the fact that the FTC did not use that word, the
FTC did not so much combine two functionally separate entrees into the
capital markets as rule that one entree may not be conducted along separate
legal paths, one an exemption and the other a registration. Likewise, a
given offering may not be grounded in part on one exemption and in part
on others; in all respects an offering must meet the requirements of one or
more exemptions. Without wishing to place too fine a point on the matter,
unless, as appears not to be the case, the requesting issuer wished to view
the in-state and out-of-state sales as more than different channels for funding
a single plan of financing, little is gained by introducing the concept of
integration to establish the noncontroversial principle that a concededly
singular financing transaction may not be partially grounded on one ex5 4
emption and partially grounded on another exemption (or on registration).,
Clearly, that conclusion required the FTC to assume that the public offering
was "part of" the same issue as the intrastate transaction, but that assumption is perfectly sensible on the facts and appears to have been conceded
in the issuer's letter of inquiry.
Only in 1938 did the SEC squarely face the issue of what today we
would call offering integration. On March 19, 1937, Unity Gold Corporation
in Appendix) (explaining purpose of rule 152); supra notes 142-148 and accompanying text
(discussing release's support of Interpretation Three); supra notes 55-60 and accompanying
text (discussing Interpretation Three of rule 152).
150. See Securities Act Release No. 33-97, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1027, at 2056
(Dec. 28, 1933).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See id.; In re Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp., 1 S.E.C. 147, 161 (1935) (stating
that to allow issuer to escape registration when issuer relies on § 3(a)(11) exemption in issuing
securities to person in one state followed by interstate distribution by that person would nullify
express purpose of Congress); Texas Glass Mfg. Corp., 38 S.E.C. 630, 634 (1958) (stating that
§ 3(a)(l1) exemption is unavailable to issuer who is unsuccessful in selling entire issue to
residents of single state and who offers rest of issue, even after registration, to residents of
other states).
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entered into two contracts for the disposition of 600,000 shares of common
stock."' One contract with a private investor provided, among other things,
that the investor purchase 75,000 shares of common stock for approximately
$47,000 cash.1 6 The statutory basis for this supposedly exempt transaction
was section 3(b) of the Securities Act, which exempts from registration
those classes of securities that the SEC exempts by rule. 157 Section 3(b) then
also provided that "no issue of securities shall be exempted under this
subsection where the aggregate amount at which such issue is offered to
the public exceeds $100,000."'ll On May 25, 1937, Unity Gold filed a
5 9
registration statement for 619,333 shares of common stock.Y
In a stoporder proceeding, the SEC held the sale to the private investor to be part
of the same "issue" as the shares covered by the registration statement
subsequently filed and, therefore, to exceed the $100,000 ceiling of section
3(b) and violate the registration requirements of the Securities Act.' °
In rejecting the issuer's contention that the two transactions were
separate, the SEC stated that
The proviso [of section 3(b)] cannot be construed to permit the
exemption of small portions of large financing operations. This
would defeat its very purpose. Thus, securities of the same class,
offered on the same general terms to the public in an uninterrupted
program of distribution, cannot be segregated into separate "issues"
merely by claiming an exemption for a limited portion of such
shares under Rule 202, or under any other rules of the Commission
adopted in accordance with Section 3(b) of the Act, and registering
6
the remainder.' '
The SEC then went on to articulate six factors that would guide the
determination of whether seemingly discrete capital financing transactions
were, in fact, one "issue.' '1 62 Those factors guided SEC thinking on the
integration question for more than two decades 63 when they were somewhat
reformulated in Release Nos. 33-4434 and 33-4552, adopted in 1961 and
1962, respectively.'6
Given the SEC's obvious concern over the integration issue in 1938, a
concern rather pointedly directed at what might be called Unity Gold's

155. Unity Gold Corp., 3 S.E.C. 618, 624 (1938).
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 624.
Id. at 623.
Id.
Id. at 620.

160. Id. at 625-26.
161. Id. at 625.

162. Id.
163. See, e.g., Opinion of the Counsel, Securities Act Release No. 33-2029, 1 Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 2141, at 2584 (Aug. 8, 1939) (noting Unity Gold's treatment of whether
seemingly separate transactions are one "issue").
164. See, e.g., Herbert R. May and Russell H. Phinney, 27 S.E.C. 814, 818-20 (1948)
(applying Unity Gold factors to determine whether separate transactions were one "issue").
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conventional "staged financing," a serious doubt exists as to whether it is
proper to interpret a 1935 SEC rule-rule 152-as authorizing, in the context
of a section 4(2) private placement followed by a public offering, precisely
what in Unity Gold the SEC said could not be done in the context of a
section 3(b) offering followed by a public offering. The Unity Gold language
quoted above evinces a rather broad policy concern about issuers dividing
financings into smaller constituent parts to subvert the policy of investor
protection as achieved by registration, a concern that did not, in the eyes
of the SEC as borne out in 1958 in the Cameron matter, 65 disappear when
a public offering is preceded by a section 4(2) rather than, as in Unity
Gold, a section 3(b) transaction. 66
Thus, at the time the SEC adopted rule 152 the SEC did not intend to
address in any definitive way the integration issue that was still crystallizing
in the collective experiences of the securities bar and the regulatory officials
under a piece of monumental legislation that was only two years old.
Indeed, as with the oft- and mis-cited 1933 FTC letter, 167 rule 152 is not
16
even directed at the subject of integration as that term is generally used.
Rule 152 is much more modest in its aim. Properly understood, rule 152
deals only with the position of the issuer who admittedly is seeking to fund
one business transaction via two distinct legal avenues, first a private offering
and then, solely because of the issuer's inability to sell all of the offered
securities, a registered public offering of the unsold securities. 69 The rule,
at bottom a definitional rule, merely provides that the earlier private
transaction does not "involve" a public offering simply because the latter
70
is subsequently deployed to sell securities that could not be sold privately.
In other words, the character of the initial attempt to dispose of securities
is not transformed by later registration. The policy rationale is obvious and
sensible-without the rule, issuers could not go forward and register unsold
securities, but would be left with the consequences of having failed to sell
in the fashion first chosen. In 1935 that would have created a tremendous
disincentive for using section 4(2). Unless an issuer was confident of putting
away the whole offering, the issuer would either not seek capital at all via

165. See supra notes 110-129 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's analysis in Cameron).
166. See Unity Gold Corp., 3 S.E.C. 618, 625-26 (1938) (disallowing § 3(b) exemption);
Cameron Indus., Inc., 39 S.E.C. 540, 546 (1958) (disallowing § 4(2) exemption); supra notes
155-164 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's analysis in Unity Gold); supra notes 110129 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's analysis in Cameron); see also Crowell-Collier
Publishing Co., Securities Act Release No. 33-3825 (Aug. 12, 1957) (SEC stated that issuer
may not establish that particular part of issue is private transaction if whole issue involves
public offering of securities; and SEC did not recognize rule 152's existence).
167. See supra notes 150-154 and accompanying text (discussing FTC's analysis in 1933

FTC letter).
168. See supra notes 5-29 and accompanying text (discussing doctrine of integration).
169. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text (discussing Interpretation Three of rule
152).
170. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (reprinting rule 152).
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the private placement or the issuer would go ahead and register the securities
at the outset. Rule 152 created a viable middle ground-try a private
placement and then, if not completely successful, finish off with a registered
public offering.
Perhaps the relationship of rule 152 to the larger integration doctrine
can be made clearer by another illustration. Suppose an issuer needs
$10,000,000. Obviously, in order to avoid registration, the issuer might seek
to divide the funding effort into two or more parts, each of which would
be made to appear freestanding and distinct from the other and so ostensibly
be exempt. The danger of doing so, however, is that the doctrine of
integration will "look through" these efforts and join the two or more
components in a way that does not meet the requirements of any one
exemption. Therefore, suppose that the issuer, believing the risk of integration in this case to be high, sets off to raise the $10,000,000 in a section
3(a)(1 1) intrastate offering. While able to raise a large portion of the fundssay $7,000,000-the issuer becomes aware that it cannot sell the remaining
$3,000,000 worth of securities within the single state. Suppose further that
the issuer then learns of a prospective purchaser who lives in another state
and that the prospective purchaser, who is accredited and sophisticated,
might be interested in purchasing the remaining $3,000,000 worth of securities. The problem for the issuer is that it cannot sell to the out-of-state
sophisticated investor in an intrastate offering, and the presence of unsophisticated in-state investors might preclude reliance on any other exemptions. Having elected to proceed as the issuer did, however, the issuer's
later problem is the longstanding problem of not being able to split exemptions to support a singular placement of securities. The issuer cannot rely
on the intrastate exemption for all purchasers except the out-of-state investor
and then rely on, for example, section 4(2) for the remaining purchaser.
What does such an issuer do? Can the issuer now turn to rule 152 and
seek to sell the remaining $3,000,000 worth of securities in a registered
public offering? Obviously, because rule 152 specifically refers only to
section 4(2) private placements, not to section 3(a)(11) offerings, this situation is not covered by the rule. 71 We may not be particularly interested
in affording the issuer relief from this dilemma in light of the fact that the
issuer initially chose not to register all $10,000,000 worth of securities.
Again, however, we speak too loosely if we characterize this as a matter
of choosing whether or not to integrate an intrastate transaction and a
public offering. Rather, it involves the narrower question of whether the
rationale of rule 152 should be applied more broadly than to section 4(2)
transactions-here, to a section 3(a)(11) transaction. Granted, the fear of
integration may have motivated the issuer to be overly ambitious in seeking
$10,000,000 from the investors of a single state rather than dividing the
funding effort into smaller parts that the SEC might legally recombine, but
that excess of ambition does not directly present the same "integration"
171. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (reprinting rule 152).
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issue if the issuer fails. Likewise, current rule 152 does not address in a
wholesale fashion all facets of the integration problem as may arise whenever
a section 4(2) placement precedes a registered offering so much as address
the problem of an unsuccessful "sticky" offering where, apparently, the
SEC is fairly sympathetic-for reasons not stated but readily understoodto an issuer's desire to extricate itself and salvage the transaction by a
subsequent registered offering. 72
Of course, this policy of relief from failure to complete a deal privately
might be extended to include other failed exempt transactions followed by
registration of the unsold securities, and without necessarily implicating the
larger doctrine of integration. For example, the failed intrastate offering
under section 3(a)(11) described above or a failed section 3(b) transaction
each might be salvaged by a subsequent public offering. Linguistically,
however, this policy objective is harder to achieve. Unlike the verb "involve"
in section 4(2), the key term in both section 3(b) and section 3(a)(11) is
"issue," and no part of an "issue" may fail to comply with the stringent
requirements of those sections.1 7 1 Moreover, and much more significantly,
the current policy underpinnings of the section 4(2) exemption differ from
those of sections 3(b), 3(a)(11), and other exemptions. For example, section
4(2) is premised on the belief that certain "financially sophisticated" investors do not need the benefit of SEC pre-offering review provided by

172. If we are correct that rule 152 originally was intended to address only the situation
of a failed private placement, not the conventional staged financing situation and the integration
problem that grows out of that, could an imaginative issuer still utilize the rule to its advantage?
Suppose an issuer needing $10,000,000 originally planned to raise $2,000,000 in a § 4(2) private
placement and the remainder in a registered public offering shortly thereafter. If we are correct
and the SEC is wrong, rule 152 offers no comfort to this issuer, and the issuer must satisfy
the traditional vague five-factor formula to avoid integration. Suppose further, however, that
to avoid that outcome, and believing our interpretation of rule 152 is correct, the issuer set
out to raise all $10,000,000 in the private placement and then when, as is likely and as the
issuer may full expect, failed to do so, proceeded to register the remaining unsold securities,
citing rule 152 as we have interpreted it in support of the proposition that "failed" private
placements are the raison d'ttre of rule 152. Here, language in the adopting release seems to
require that the issuer not "contemplate registration" at the time of the private placement.
See supra note 143 and accompanying text and note 148 (pointing out that decision to register
securities not sold in private offering must be "subsequent" to that offering). Thus, it is
doubtful whether a cunning issuer could use our narrower interpretation of rule 152 to,
nonetheless, obtain relief from the continuing spectre of integration and its haunting impact
on conventional multiround financing.
173. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (discussing that § 3(a)(l1) exempts
from § 5 of Securities Act any security that is "part of an issue" offered and sold only to
persons residing within single state); supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing that §
3(b) states that no "issue" of securities sold under § 3(b) may exceed $5,000,000). In 1959
the then Director of the then Division of Trading and Exchanges stated that "if an issuer
starts an intrastate offering and finds that the entire issue cannot be sold in the state, it cannot
file a registration statement or comply with regulation A in order to sell the balance of the
offering interstate since in such event the entire issue would not be limited to the state and
the exemption would be lost as to the initial offering." Loomis, Enforcement Problems Under
the Federal Securities Laws, 14 Bus. LAw. 665, 670-71 (1959) (emphasis added).
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registration as long as they receive registration statement-like disclosure.1 4
Section 3(a)(11) is premised on the ability of states to regulate wholly instate capital formation.' 71 SEC rules adopted pursuant to section 3(b) have
varied policy rationales. Rule 504 offerings are sufficiently small not to
warrant intrusive federal regulation, and certain of them will receive scrutiny
by state regulatory officials; rule 505 requires a private placement memorandum providing registration statement-like disclosure-but not pre-offering SEC review-for nonaccredited investors; regulation A provides investors
with an offering circular, the disclosures in which are modeled after but
less demanding than those in a registration statement. Consequently, to
extend the original policy of rule 152 to other failed exempt offerings might
best be done by more formal rulemaking procedures in light of the linguistic
obstacles and in light of the fact that the different policy bases of the
various exemptions might conflict with the policy of salvaging "sticky"
placements and therefore dictate not providing relief from failed offerings
for those issuers who rely on exemptions other than section 4(2). On the
other hand, the policy rationales of other exemptions-particularly the
contemporary significance of the section 3(b) exemptions on capital formation by small businesses-might make certain of them more likely candidates for regulatory relief here as elsewhere. So viewed, the way in which
both the narrow concern of rule 152 and the broader issue of integration
itself are inextricably connected to the ever evolving policies of registration
and exemptions becomes plainly visible. 176 The more immediate point,
however, is simply that neither with respect to the subject matter of existing
rule 152-failed section 4(2) private placements-nor with respect to an
extension of the limited policy rationale of rule 152 to other failed exempt
transactions is offering integration, as that term is commonly understood
in the multiround financing context, really the subject.
V. THE CONSEQUENCES OF MISINTERPRETING RULE 152.
Integration is widely regarded as a necessary but troublesome concept.
Integration is necessary because it prevents subversion of the registration
requirements of the Securities Act. 177 Integration is troublesome because the
concept has not been firmly linked to a modern conception of the purposes
and policies of registration and exemptions therefrom. The prevailing fivefactor formula is fuzzy, subjective, and imprecise as to how many and

174. See H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1933) (discussing rationale for §
4(2)); supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text (discussing § 4(2) premise that certain "financially sophisticated" investors do not need SEC pre-offering review that registration provides).
175. See S. Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1933) (discussing rationale for § 3(a)(11));
H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1933) (same).
176. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing relation of rule 152 and
integration doctrine to policies of registration and exemptions).
177. See ABA Task Force Report on Integration, supra note 26, at 595 (discussing
purposes of integration concept); supra notes 5-29 and accompanying text (discussing doctrine
of integration).
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which of the five criteria the issuer must satisfy to attain the desired status
of nonintegration. The result is a doctrine well-suited in its fluidity to the
remedial task of revisiting and upsetting capital-raising transactions that, in
retrospect, were unsatisfactory to investors and, fortuitously, also should
have been registered. Consequently, the concept affords a potent remedy
by fraud, and the concept perhaps is
for "bad" deals, even if unblemished
78
to be valued for that alone.
Whether the concept in its current state has other benefits as wellencouraging registration instead of either foregoing a financing transaction
or risking later application of the doctrine-that, on balance, outweigh the
alleged "costs" of deterring desired capital formation is difficult to answer.
What is not difficult to see, however, is that, whether a virtue or a vice,
issuers and their legal counsel operate in a world of uncertainty and doubt
because of the current formulation of the doctrine. Over the years, the
SEC's actions on the integration front seem to reflect a curious ambivalence
toward the notion. The SEC has supplied specific safe harbors from the
doctrine's application-thereby affording a measure of certainty for issuers
and thus advancing the goal of capital formation-while at the same time
retaining the concept in all its useful vagueness in all other settings-thereby
preserving the concept's vitality for both goading registration and remedying
unsatisfactory investments. The SEC's action on rule 152 represents yet
another step in the direction of the certainty and capital formation pole.
Those in sympathy with that policy objective are, therefore, pleased with
the recent initiatives. Yet, we suggest that, whatever one's position on the
larger policy issues, the SEC has not offered genuine certainty in even the
relatively narrow context in which it mistakenly believes rule 152 applies.
Moreover, the SEC's manner of proceeding on this matter has in fact
detracted from a surer resolution of the larger issues raised by integration.
We believe this for several reasons.
First, as a historical matter, the SEC is misreading rule 152. No doubt,
literally the words of the text do "contain" the reading given by the SEC.
But those who interpret administrative rules-or statutes or constitutionsmust seek the intentions of the writer. In doing so-that is, in being a
"legal intentionalist' 79 -of course one looks at the words themselves, but
attention also must be paid to the background of and perceived problem
addressed by the rule8 0 and to the larger milieu, regulatory and otherwise,
'

178. See J. SELiGMN, THE SEC AND THE FurruiR oF FnANcE 24648 (1985) (arguing that
SEC should regularly analyze likely extent to which mandatory disclosure law change will
increase or decrease securities fraud or unfairness and increase or decrease incidence of fraud).
179. See R. PosNER, LAW AND LiTRATuRE 218 (1988) (discussing "legal intentionalist").
Judge Posner states that a legal intentionalist in reading a statute or the Constitution tries to
"figure out from the words, the structure, the background, and any other available information
how the legislators whose votes were necessary for enactment would probably have answered"
a question of statutory interpretation if the question had occurred to them. Id.
180. See generally LaRue, Statutory Interpretation:Lord Coke Revisited, 48 U. PrrT. L.
REv. 733 (1987) (discussing need to read statutes in relation to problem legislators sought to
address).
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in which the rule was promulgated. Clearly, opening the interpretative task
to include contextual factors potentially empowers the interpreter to depart
from the writer's intended meaning and to supply his own. But, in construing
legal texts, the check on such interpretative license is the continual seeking
of the writer's intention, not, as when examining literary texts, responding
to the private aesthetic tastes of the reader. Seeking the writer's intention
preserves the integrity of the rule- or statute-making body from improper
encroachment by the interpreting body, often a judge or administrative
agency, while freeing that body to seek guidance from sources outside the
text itself.
Applying this exegetical principle to the narrow problem of rule 152,
for the reasons indicated we have little doubt that the writers of the rule
did not intend it to be applied in the way the SEC has done in Verticom
and subsequent no-action requests. One cannot so cavalierly depart from
the intended meaning of a rule in formulating "desirable" legal policy
without, in effect, simply substituting the will of the reader (here, the staff
of the SEC) for the idea of the rule of law.
Second, because we believe that the SEC reading of rule 152 is erroneous, it is useful to recall that a court is not bound by SEC no-action
letters. After all, a no-action letter is just that-a statement that the staff
would recommend that the SEC take "no action" if the deeds in question
transpired.'8 ' The SEC itself has emphasized that no-action and interpretive
responses by the staff are subject to reconsideration and should not be
regarded as precedents binding on the full Commission.'12 Additionally, the
SEC has reminded issuers that "persons receiving advice from the staff of
the Commission that no action will be recommended if they proceed without
registration... should do so only with full realization that the test so
applied may not be proof against claims by purchasers of the security that
registration should have been effected."' 3 Thus, while a no-action response
can be of considerable comfort to an issuer, inasmuch as neither the full
Commission nor a court is bound by the staff's interpretation of rule 152
the securities bar may be lulled into relying too heavily on that interpretation.
Nothing prevents an aggrieved purchaser in a section 4(2) private placement
from bringing an action against a corporation and arguing that the placement
should be integrated with a subsequent registered public offering. In such
a case, although the issuer will argue that a court should find the SEC's
interpretation of rule 152 to be controlling, the court is free to find that

181. See Lowenfels, SEC "No-Action" Letters: Some Problems and Suggested Approaches, 71 COLuM. L. REv. 1256, 1256-57 (1971) (discussing definition and function of "noaction letter").
182. See Securities Act Release No. 33-5073 (July 14, 1970) (stating that no-action and
interpretative responses by SEC staff are not binding precedents on SEC); ABA Task Force
Report on Integration, supra note 26, at 613 n.75 (noting that no-action letters do not bind

SEC).
183. Securities Act Release No. 33-4552, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
(Nov. 6, 1962).

2783, at 2922
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the private placement and subsequent public offering should be combined,
or, at least, that rule 152 is no bar to integration. Therefore, the SEC's
reading of rule 152 does not save issuers from claims by those with the
greatest incentive to make an integration argument-the investment community.
Third, as a kind of corollary to the above, even if the full Commission
rather than the staff was departing from the intended purpose of rule 152
in "interpreting" the rule, the agency action would be improper. As a
matter of administrative law it is improper for an agency to use a rule
designed for one specific purpose to accomplish an altogether different
objective. Courts have long held that agencies can use adjudications to
interpret rules, but not to amend or revoke those rules.114 In not allowing
agencies to adjudicatively amend or alter regulations in the name of interpreting them, courts state that agencies are bound by their regulations, and
the courts conclude that to depart from a regulation is reversible error.' 85
Through its apparently radical interpretation of rule 152, the SEC is
departing from the rule's intended purpose. Thus, a court, if given a chance
by an aggrieved purchaser, might find that the staff of the SEC has abused
its discretion. Moreover, in essence the SEC has used the no-action format
to enact its own "pet theory" about one facet of the integration problem." s6
As a matter of proper administrative procedure, not only should an existing
rule not be distorted, but the no-action machinery should not be used to
effect a dramatic shift in policy. Rather, a more formal rule promulgation,
with the attendant safeguards of notice, comment, and careful deliberation,
is the preferred avenue of action.
Fourth, the SEC's approach to rule 152 is indicative of its piecemeal
approach to the integration problem, an approach that avoids genuinely
revisiting the doctrine in a satisfactorily thorough manner. This observation

184. See, e.g., Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 1322, 1328-29, 1331-32 (9th
Cir. 1982) (holding that agency acted improperly in attempting to amend informal rule
adjudicatively); Bahat v. Sureck, 637 F.2d 1315, 1318 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that situations
exist where agency reliance on adjudication to announce and apply new standard of conduct
would be abuse of discretion); United States v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 563 F.2d 1008, 101113 (10th Cir. 1977) (concluding that agency could not adjudicatively undertake action that was
inconsistent with agency's informal rule). One problem in analyzing agency behavior in the
adjudicatory context is that no clear conception exists between what constitutes an "interpretation" and what constitutes an "amendment." Agencies can keep interpretation within defined
parameters. See Weaver, JudicialInterpretation of Administrative Regulations: An Overview,
53 U. Csn. L. Rav. 681, 721-28 (1984) (discussing approaches to interpretation of statutory
language).
185. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 3090 v. NLRB, 777 F.2d 751, 759
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (stating that agency is bound by rule or regulation until agency amends or
repeals rule or regulation by legislative means); Teleprompter Cable Communication Corp. v.
FCC, 565 F.2d 736, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (stating that FCC's notion of public interest cannot
justify FCC's failure to act in manner consistent with FCC precedents).
186. See Lowenfels, supra note 181 at 1266-69 (discussing problem that various SEC staff
members use "no-action" machinery to enact into "law" their own personal interpretations
of securities rules).
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has two dimensions. First, the SEC still has not addressed numerous
problems and uncertainties in and related to the integration penumbra
surrounding staged financing. For example, while rule 152 as the SEC
currently interprets it will not result in a public offering being brought
"backwards" into a section 4(2) placement, can such a private placement
be brought "forward" into a public offering and thereby constitute "gun
jumping" of the public offering? Under section 5(c) of the Securities Act
the act of offering to sell a security is illegal unless the issuer has filed a
registration statement. 8 7 Because the term "offer" is given a very broad
reading, the issuer and others must be careful during the pre-filing period
that the issuer's behavior not be construed as "designed to awaken an
interest that later would be focused on [a] specific financing" and that
would constitute "the first step in a sales campaign" and so be viewed as
an "offer."' 8 8 An issuer, feeling relieved as to the risk of integration, which
relief heightens the attractiveness of the private placement, may engage in
selling efforts that link the placement to a soon-to-follow public offering.
In doing so the issuer may "in fact contribute to conditioning the public
mind or arousing public interest in the issuer or in the securities of an
issuer"' 1,9 in a way that raises the prospect that its private financing activities,
unless carefully monitored, constitute gun-jumping. Rule 152 simply does
not address that separate issue.
Nor does the SEC's new interpretation of rule 152 have a great deal of
practical value. Rule 152 does not preclude the integration of one exempt
offering with another exempt offering. Thus, while a single section 4(2)
private placement and subsequent registered public offering might not be
integrated, true multiround financing is not made significantly easier in view
of the fact that a non-section 4(2) exempt transaction (or possibly another
section 4(2) transaction) might be integrated with the section 4(2) private
placement without preclusion by rule 152. Furthermore, nothing in the rule
prevents the integration of a registered public offering with exempt capital
formation activity premised on sections other than section 4(2). Thus, rule
152 does not cover integration of transactions grounded on section 3(a)(11)
or section 3(b)-which, together, form the legal basis for a great deal of
private capital formation-and subsequent registered public offerings. If the
SEC wishes to allow an issuer to plan a subsequent public offering before
undertaking a private placement pursuant to section 4(2) or rule 506, the
SEC should state why an issuer should not also be allowed to plan a public
offering to follow a rule 147, rule 504, or rule 505 transaction. While the
statutory underpinnings of those rules are not section 4(2), at the time the
SEC adopted rule 152-in 1935-there was little flesh to the section 3(b)

187. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982).
188. See Securities Act Release No. 33-3844, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 3256, at 3150
(Oct. 8, 1957) (using examples to illustrate specific pre-filing behavior that would violate § 5
of Securities Act).
189. Id. 3254, at 3149.
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exemption. Currently, however, the SEC has issued rules 504 and 505 under
section 3(b) and each of the rules represents the striking of a modern
regulatory balance between the objectives of investor protection and small

issuer capital formation. The logic of the SEC's interpretation of rule 152
should be forthrightly extended to, or forthrightly rejected with respect to,
those rules. 190
This last point raises the other dimension of a problem with the SEC's
specific action under rule 152-and general inaction on the broader integration front. The SEC has failed to provide a reasoned statement as to
why, as a policy matter, section 4(2) private placements followed by registered public offerings should not be integrated. Why not also, to choose
one small example, refrain from integrating section 4(2) placements followed
by rule 504 offerings? What is lacking is a convincing expression of why
certain exempted activity preceding registrationis different. If the later event
of registration itself is the key, then why is registration not sufficient to
absolve non-section 4(2) exempt activity of the integration taint? If the key
is the nature of the investor in a section 4(2) placement, then, apart from
the aggregation problem, why not free an issuer from the risk of integration
created by a subsequent rule 504 offering? And, further, similarly free the
issuer from the risk of integration with respect to the rule 504 transaction?
And so on.
Fundamentally then, what the SEC has not directly grappled with in
the integration area is the same issue that lurks ever near the question of
whether the several requirements of a particular exemption have been
fulfilled-what today is the purpose of registration? If the purpose is to
provide prospective investors with certain mandated information, then, so
long as that is done, why have other conditions and proscriptions such as,

in the section 4(2) and regulation D area, prohibitions on general solicitation

and advertising? 191 Why not, for example, have an exemption conditioned

190. See Frome, Multiround Financings: A New Development on Integration Issue,
N.Y.L.J., Apr. 3, 1986, at 1, col. I (arguing that SEC should extend rule 152 to cover rules
504 and 505 of regulation D). Mr. Frome suggests that the SEC should interpret rule 152
more broadly and apply the rule to any regulation D offering rather than merely applying the
rule to rule 506 offerings. See id. Frome argues that no distinction exists between the regulation
exemptions provided under § 4(2) and regulation D. Id. Frome argues further that the SEC is
acting inconsistently by treating integration questions under the two registration exemptions
differently. Frome states that, because the statutory origins of regulation D are found in §
4(2), it follows that, if rule 152 permits a public offering subsequent to a § 4(2) offering, a
similar reasoning should prevail to permit a public offering subsequent to any regulation D
offering. Frome's argument is flawed, however, in that the statutory origins of regulation D
are found in both § 4(2) and § 3(b). Regulation D consists, inter alia, of rules 504, 505, and
506. The statutory source of the exemptions that rules 504 and 505 provide is § 3(b) of the
Securities Act. See ABA Task Force Report on Integration, supra note 26, at 604 (noting
statutory source of rules 504 and 505). The statutory source of the rule 506 exemption is §
4(2). See id. (noting statutory source of rule 506). Rule 152 says nothing about allowing a
public offering subsequent to a § 3(b) offering, thus precluding application of that rule to the
question of whether a public offering should be integrated with a § 3(b) offering.
191. See generally Daugherty, Rethinking the Ban on General Solicitation, 38 EMORY L.J.
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solely on the dissemination of substantially the same information as would
be received in a registration statement since, if an offering were registered,
such information is all that the investor-whether sophisticated or unsophisticated-would receive. The difference, of course, is SEC pre-sale review.
Thus, the real issue is how significant to the modern objectives of
regulated capital markets that review remains. We are not here suggesting
the wholesale abandonment of SEC review in favor of a self-governing
regime essentially administered by the private securities bar, somewhat akin
to current practice under regulation D. We contend only that the regulatory
issues raised by the new fascination with the specific goal of capital
formation and the larger goal of deregulation, be they manifested in calls
for relaxing regulation D, 192 rethinking the policy premises and parameters
of section 4(2), or clarifying the contours of the integration doctrine, all
bottom on more fundamental matters. The SEC, somehow, ought to face
those matters squarely, not leave the matters buried in an uncoordinated
jumble of regulatory complexity where the sheer mass of rules often makes
rethinking of core premises so difficult, brat therefore so necessary. However
much we would like to provoke express rethinking of the first order questions
on which all else in capital market regulation depends, we believe a very
modest proposal on a fairly obscure rule can start moving securities professionals and regulators in that direction. We suggest that the SEC either
modify its position to conform to the true purpose of rule 152 or change
rule 152 to conform to the SEC's interpretation of the rule. And, most
important, the SEC should state why it has so acted, and why those actions
are both desirable and sufficient.

67 (1989) (advocating that prohibition on general solicitation and advertising be eliminated as
condition to § 4(2) exemption).
192. See Securities Act Release No. 33-6825, 54 Fed. Reg. 11,369, 11,374 (1989) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.508) (adopting new rule 508 as amendment to regulation D).
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APPENDIX
For IMMEDIATE Release Saturday, March 2, 1935.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
Release No. 305
The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced the adoption
of the following rule defining transactions not involving any public offering
made prior to the filing of a registration statement. The rule makes clear
that offerings made prior to the filing of the registration statement and
made under circumstances which did not necessitate registration or contemplate registration, do not by the fact of registration become the type of
offerings which are prohibited by the Securities Act. The rule allows those
who have contemplated or begun to undertake a private offering to register
the securities without incurring any risk of liability as a consequence of
having first contemplated or begun to undertake a private offering. The
rule is as follows:
Regulation defining transactionsnot involving any public offering made
prior to filing of registration statement. The phrase "transactions by an
issuer not involving any public offering" as used in Section 4(1) of the
Securities Act of 1933 shall be deemed to apply to transactions not involving
any public offering at the time of said transactions although subsequently
thereto the issuer decides to make a public offering and/or files a registration
statement.

